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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF FRANCHISING 
The following study was conducted in an effort to see 
what had, or had not changed in the franchising industry 
from the time the original study concluded in 1973. The 
original study was conducted by Dr. Gerald G. Udell, who 
identified 158 contractual provisions as a basis in com­
paring franchise contracts. This comparison identified the 
presence of the provisions, and questioned the fairness in 
the franchisor's application of the provisions. This fol­
low-up study consists of reviewing published literature of 
the original study, and conducting a survey similar to find 
out what had changed in the interim years.
Franchising's origin actually began during the Middle 
Ages. Historically, kings and noblemen granted fiefs land 
to live and farm on. In return, the fiefs provided revenue 
from the sale of their crops, and in war, the fiefs would 
serve as loyal troops. This practice ended in 1562 with the 
enactment of the Council of Trent, but the basic idea of 
franchising had been established.
Franchising came to America in 1496, when King Henry 
VII granted Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot) and sons the 
following:
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We have given and granted to them, their heires and 
deputies, that all the firme lands, isles, villages, 
townes, castles, and places whatsoever they be that 
they shall chance to finde, may not of any other of our 
subjects be frequented or visited without the license 
of the foresayd John and his sonnes...
Modern franchising began prior to the end of the Civil 
War when Singer Sewing Machine Company chose franchising as 
a method of distribution.̂  As time passed, more business 
persons used this method of distribution and company names 
became well known throughout the country. Examples of 
companies include Rexall Drugs, General Motors, and Pepsi­
Cola.
Problems in Franchising 
Since World War II, America has experienced exponential 
growth in business enterprises.̂  With this growth came 
problems in fair trade, fair wages, business ethics and 
generally deciding what was good for the franchising 
industry.
To give the reader some idea how big this industry is, 
the following is a list of the five largest franchise res­
taurant chains and their sales in 1986 and 1987.
1986 SALES 1987 SALESFRANCHISE fin billions! fin billions!
1. McDonald's $12.4 $14.3
2. Burger King 5.0 5.6
3. Kentucky Fried 3.5 4.1
4. Hardee's 2.7 3.0
5. Wendy's 2.7 2.8
Source: Harriet 
Hungers for Fast 
ed.), p. 8B.
C. Johnson, "Franchise 
Food". fUSA TODAY. 11 Industry February 1988
2
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According to the 1987 Commerce Department report, sales 
at fast food establishments are expected to grow more than 
11 percent in 1990. They also estimate that 91,000 fran­
chised restaurants will operate in 1988, up 9.2 percent from 
the 83,331 figure in 1987.
Franchised businesses grew rapidly, and with this 
growth came indecision, confusion, chaos and contradiction 
on how to own and operate a franchised business that met 
standards of fairness. Because of the rapid growth and 
relative newness of this industry, many opportunities for 
unfair practices in the daily transactions between fran­
chisor and franchisee existed.
As Dr. Gerald G. Udell stated in a research article, 
titled, "The Franchise Agreement Handbook".
...franchising represents a compromise between the franchisee's desire for independence and his desire for 
security (risk reduction). To a degree, these desires are incompatible and mutually exclusive".''
Because the relationship between these two elements of 
security and independence may not be adequately understood 
by the franchisee, he may be easily deceived by a one-sided 
franchise agreement. In defining a one-sided franchise 
agreement, the reader should envision two tribes coexisting 
on an island. Tribe one, the franchisor, is armed with guns 
and ammunition, and tribe two, the franchisee, is armed with 
spears and knives. Because tribe one has superior weaponry, 
it is able to impose its will upon tribe two. This imposi­
tion can produce fear, confusion and a rebellious attitude. 
In the end, neither party may be well served.
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The one-sided franchise agreement brought much
attention to the small business community in 1970. Speaking
before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee with a prepared text,
Harold Brown, a critic of franchising, testified as follows:
There is a marked, intentional, and constantly 
emphasized disparity in the positions of the parties—  
the franchisor combining the roles of father, teacher, 
and drill sergeant, with the franchisee relegated to 
those of son, pupil, and buck-private, respectively . . 
. . control is buttressed by the contractual require­
ment that the franchisee must obey the commands of the 
operating manual as expounded by the franchisor's 
supervisor, on pain of losing the franchise if he 
disobeys them and under constant threat of such ter­
mination.^
And upon termination, or failure to renew the franchise 
contract, the franchisee is often confronted with the 
covenant to compete and forfeiture of his equity in the 
business.
What Harold Brown said to that 1970 U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee is the essence of what troubles most potential 
franchisees. As Mr. Brown indicated, if one could obtain an 
operating manual, one would often find stipulations within 
that are dubious in nature or in favor of the franchisor.* 
These types of practices have led to many supposedly sig­
nificant changes in the franchising industry.
To further examine possible changes in the franchise 
industry, a hypothesis was formed to determine whether 
nationally known fast food franchises were being over­
controlled through numerous contract provisions when com­
pared to regionally known fast food franchises.
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The remainder of this paper contains: Chapter 2, which
reviews the previous study in franchise contractual 
agreements in 1973 by Dr. Gerald Udell. Chapter 3 is a 
presentation of a present day study in franchise agreements 
conducted in 1988. Chapter 4 discusses the results of the 
present day study. Chapter 5 is a summary of the research 
and the results.
In addition, there are three appendices. Appendix I 
defines and lists the contractual provisions used in the 
research. Appendix II is an illustration of a letter solic­
iting franchisor support of the research. Appendix III 
compares the numerical occurrence of each provision from the 
original study versus the present day study.
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CHAPTER 2 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In 1973, Dr. Gerald G. Udell conducted extensive 
research into the fairness of contractual agreements between 
franchisors and franchisees in an effort to aid those who 
seek to understand the franchise agreement and its inter­
relationship between franchisors and franchisees.
Dr. Udell used the following four phases to conduct his 
research:
Phase 1. Solicit franchise agreements
Requests were mailed to franchisors soliciting a copy 
of the contracts they used to conduct business. Three 
groups of franchise system were solicited. They were fast 
foods, convenience food stores, and coin-operated laundries. 
One hundred forty-three contracts were received from the 
three groups. Of those contracts received, one hundred 
twenty-two were from the fast food franchisors.̂  The 
remaining contracts were from the laundries and convenience 
stores.
Aside from the three groups mentioned above, there were 
approximately 400 other franchised systems that could be 
grouped into sixty franchise industries. From these
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franchise systems, one hundred franchisors were solicited 
for contracts, only sixteen were received. Thirteen 
contracts were obtained from other sources, and ten were 
received after the analysis had been completed, making the 
total number of contracts observed to be one hundred eighty- 
two . *
Phase 2. Contract analysis and classification of elements.
In this phase, each contract was analyzed to identify 
the contract elements it contained. The provisions in each 
contract were entered into a log and were grouped based upon 
commonality (i.e. advertising, supplies).
These provisions can be further combined into several 
sections ;
Section 1 is concerned with payments to franchisors, 
indirect payments, special payments, penalties, security 
deposit, and termination penalties.
Section 2 discusses general contract provisions. This 
includes length of contract terms, option to renew, exclu­
sive territory, start-up date, franchisor confidential 
disclosure, franchisee confidential disclosure, independent 
contractor, hold harmless, act of God, no waiver of default, 
illegal covenant, legal business, franchisee association 
forbidden, right to future revision, operating manual, 
goodwill payments, correction of deficiency, compliance with 
local laws, franchise disability, arbitration, and site 
selection.
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Section 3 deals with miscellaneous contract provisions. 
It covers incorporation permitted, trademark restrictions, 
distinctive architecture, ethical behavior, state of inter­
pretation, venue clause, sub-franchising, civil rights, full 
time, competitive business, restriction on sale of goods, 
product service, sales quota, and guaranteed sales.
Section 4 concerns provisions of uniformity. This 
outlines physical layout, local variations permitted, days 
open, hours open, product line, price control, and altera­
tion approval.
Section 5 discusses provisions of occupancy. This 
includes franchisee ownership, franchisor ownership, fran­
chisee lease, franchisor lease, lease approval, notice of 
non-compliance, lease back, lease loss.
Section 6 covers obligations of the franchisor. This 
section outlines the franchisor's obligations to analyze 
reports, to advertise, to account for advertising funds, to 
advise and consult, inspect, advise franchisee of changes, 
and grand opening assistance.
Section 7 describes bookkeeping provisions which 
includes bank approval, bookkeeping system approval, fran­
chisor's bookkeeping system required, annual certified 
audit, right to audit books, margin of error, federal income 
tax copy, periodic reports, cash withdrawal, and profit 
withdrawal.
Section 8 elaborates on employee conduct and training. 
Covered in this section are employee uniforms, employee
8
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conduct, number of employees, right to hire and fire, fran­
chisee formal training, refresher course, training of sub­
sequent managers, training of key employees, all employee 
training, and on-the-job training and assistance.
Section 9 defines insurance provisions that deal with 
franchisor administration, franchisor co-insured, cancella­
tion notice, approval of franchisee's insurance company, 
proof of insurance, and the different types of insurance to 
include; business interruption, workers' compensation, 
personal, employer liability, product liability, and 
property liability.
Section 10 discusses purchasing provisions which 
involves the franchisee's purchase of paper goods, operating 
supplies and services, equipment, signs, price restriction, 
franchisor/vendor rebate, and vending approval.
Section 11 provides insight to provisions of adver­
tising. This covers franchisor/franchisee advertising, the 
franchisor's right to enter and destroy, requirements for 
signs, the franchisor's approval of advertising, and adver­
tising association or committee.
Section 12 covers the provisions in franchise termina­
tion and sale. This section discusses the franchisor's 
right of first approval, the franchisee's right of first 
refusal, the right of inheritance, the franchisor's approval 
of sale, no "for sale" advertising, binding upon successors, 
stock transfer approval, and no goodwill payments.
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Section 13 discusses the terms of termination. These 
terras are failure to pay, franchisee/franchisor right to 
early termination, termination for any violation, termina­
tion for bankruptcy, training failure or violation of stan­
dards, immediate cancellation, and grace periods.
Section 14 provides for the franchisee's obligation 
after termination. These provisions are described in a 
series of covenants. There are covenants not to compete, 
not to hire, not to use the franchise system, cease opera­
tions, change the building, remove signs, and paying the 
cost of enforcing these covenants should the franchisee 
refuse to comply.
Finally, section 15 outlines the provisions for sale 
after the termination of the franchised business. These 
provisions describe the procedures used by the franchisor in 
a buy back of assets from the former franchisee.
To ensure the contracts collected were a representation 
of the industry's franchise agreements, three steps were 
taken :
1. A review of the literature was made to identify 
additional provisions.
2. A test of redundancy was used to determine whether or 
not a sufficient amount of contracts were gathered from 
each major group.
3. Panel members in the research were asked during the 
third phase to mention any provisions not previously 
listed.
10
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The use of three independent steps, provided a check on the 
accuracy and completeness of the franchise agreement 
analysis.’
Phase 3. Review Elements with the Panel of Experts, 
Franchisors, and Franchisees.
In this phase, a panel reviewed each contractual 
element to: 1) expand the knowledge about the elements by
including the experiences of the other panel members; 2) 
ensure correct interpretation; 3) judge each provision in 
terms of importance, equitable nature, and legality; and 4) 
reduce the number of contractual elements to a manageable 
number.
The panel consisted of twenty-nine franchisors, fran­
chisees, franchise consultants, franchise lawyers, represen­
tatives of franchise associations, and several state and 
federal agencies interested in franchising.^^
In order to select criteria to be used by the panel 
during this phase, a total of ten questions were reviewed by 
a small group consisting of two franchisors, two 
franchisees, and two faculty members. The ten questions are 
paraphrased below:
1. Is the provision of importance to either party?
2. Is it essential?
3. Does it create the opportunity for fraud or unfair
advantage?
4. Are the demands reasonable?
5. Is the clause enforceable?
11
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6. Does it protect the interests of both parties?
7. Is the provision ethical?
8. Are payments and penalties fair and earned?
9. Does the contract element protect the interests of both 
parties?
10. Does the provision favor one party or the other?
Phase 4. Mail Survey of Franchisors and Franchisees.
Surveys were mailed to two hundred sixty-nine fran­
chisors, two hundred thirty-four franchisees, and seventy- 
five franchise experts, which included franchise consul­
tants, lawyers, authors, trade journal editors/publishers, 
and federal and state agencies.
A total of 588 questionnaires were mailed. Of the 588 
surveys sent out, only 160 were returned. Twelve of these 
were returned too late, thus reducing the sample size to 
140. Half of the participants in the survey were chosen 
from a national, randomly selected, sample of telephone 
books. The other half was selected from telephone books in 
the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana. The men­
tioned states were chosen because they were in close 
proximity to the research site, thus allowing the 
researchers ample opportunities to conduct interviews with 
the participants without traveling great distances.
Wherein a true random sample would provide more 
validity, the previous study did note that a true random 
sample selection of the franchise industry was virtually 
impossible due to the unavailability of a list of
12
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franchises. However, it was estimated that there were 
500,000 franchises in the United States, with 50,000 new 
franchise businesses being formed each year
Phase 5. Analysis of Contract Elements.
In this phase, personal interviews were conducted in 
the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Washington, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Michigan. The results from the 
previous four phases and the interviews were incorporated 
into a composite analysis.
In summarizing the results of Dr. Udell's study, it was 
revealed that the franchise agreement plays a major role in 
the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. The 
results also revealed that much of the unfairness in fran­
chising is found in the franchise agreement. A paraphrased 
definition of an unfair provision provided by the initial 
study can be stated as a provision that does not offer the 
franchisee the same basic rights as extended to the fran­
chisor. Additionally, an unfair provision can be used to 
manipulate or force the franchisee to perform in a way that 
may not be conducive for a healthy or profitable business, 
but it provides larger payments or profits to the 
franchisor.
Most contracts were one-sided in favor of the fran­
chisor, giving rise to unfair franchisee - franchisor rela­
tionship. As an example of the one-sided relationship, the 
examining panel did not find one contract that dealt with
13
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franchisor's non-performance. The franchisee could, 
however, heavily penalized or terminated for non­
performance.
There were clauses that created situations whereby the 
franchisor could benefit financially by treating the fran­
chisee unfairly. As examples, there were provisions 
requiring the franchisee to purchase standard goods or 
material from specified sources, termination or heavy penal­
ties should the franchisee commit the slightest deviation 
from contract provisions, or the presence of unreasonable 
rates of depreciation.
According to Dr. Udell, provisions of this nature 
create incentives for unfair treatment of the franchisee by 
the unethical franchisor.
Despite the results mentioned above, the panel did find 
many ethical franchisors who were diligently trying to 
provide good services to the franchisees.
Phase 3 found that in the long run, some provisions 
such as those found during the study, opened the door to 
unfair treatment of the franchisee. Furthermore, many of 
the provisions were questionable in ethics and legality.
The panel also found that many provisions contributed to 
suspicion, mistrust, and could be removed or rewritten with 
little effect on the franchise contract.
Depicted in Table 1 are the sections previously dis­
cussed. The table also gives the number of provisions each
section contains and also indicates the number of provisions
14
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found to be unfair. The following chapter will identify and 
discuss the unfair provisions from each section.
In cross-referencing the information in the initial 
study with current literature, the author did not find any 
material that performed research or gathered data as the 
initial study. What was gained from the cross-reference was 
a different insight to franchising as it appears to others.
15
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TABLE 1
Key Concerns Identified in the Previous Research
Section
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8 .
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Contract Provisions
Payments to the Franchisor.
General Contract Provisions.
Miscellaneous Contract Provisions.
Provisions of Uniformity.
Provisions of Occupancy.
Obligations of the Franchisor.
Bookkeeping Provisions.
Employee Conduct and Training.
Insurance Provisions.
Purchasing Provisions.
Provisions of Advertising.
Provisions in Franchise Termination and Sale.
Terms of Termination.
Franchisee's Obligation After Termination.
Provisions for Sale After the Termination.
No. of Provisions in section
15
21
14
7
8
7
10
10
11
17
5
10
11
8
No. of Unfair Provisions in section
4
4
0
2
2
0
1
2
1
4
1
1
4
2
16
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CHAPTER 3 
PRESENT STUDY 
This study was designed to follow up on Dr. Udell's 
research. It was conducted beginning in November, 1987, and 
ending in January, 1988. The purpose of the follow-up 
research was to determine the changes in franchise contract 
provisions during the past fifteen years.
Since the majority of franchise contracts received in 
the Udell study were from fast food franchised businesses,
67 percent (122 out of 182), it was decided that the follow- 
up study would focus only on the fast food franchise con­
tracts. If significant changes were identified in this 
industry, then other industries could be looked at as well.
Scope of Research 
Primary research was limited to the data from the 
franchise contracts received from each franchise home 
office. Secondary data was drawn from Mr. Terry Sutton, who 
has been a manager at two nationally known fast food 
franchises, and from Dr. Udell, who is a member of the 
faculty at the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks, 
North Dakota.
The research procedures used in the follow-up study are 
a derivative of those used in 1973 by Dr. Udell. The judg­
mental criteria in determining a fair or unfair provision
17
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were abstracted from the analysis of the initial study and 
were used in the present study. A paraphrased definition 
of an unfair provision provided by the initial study can be 
stated as a provision that does not offer the franchisee the 
same basic rights as extended to the franchisor. Addition­
ally, an unfair provision can be used to manipulate or force 
the franchisee to perform in a way that may not be conducive 
for healthy or profitable business, but it provides larger 
payments, or profits to the franchisor.
Research Procedures 
Franchise contracts were requested from the fran­
chisors. In keeping the research manageable, one hundred 
letters were mailed to franchisors requesting copies of 
contracts they used in starting new franchisees in their 
systems. The one hundred franchisors selected to receive 
the letters requesting copies were obtained from a listing 
of franchise businesses Dr. Udell kept current. This list 
included those franchises from the previous study that are 
still in business today and franchises that have come into 
existence since that time.
The selection process divided the franchisors into two 
categories: (1) nationally known franchises and (2) region­
ally known franchises. A nationally known franchise is 
defined as a franchise system that is recognized by U.S. 
consumers from coast to coast. A regionally known franchise 
is not known nationally, but it may be quite prevalent in a 
particular region of the United States.
18
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Each category contained fifty franchisors. The selection of 
franchise systems in each category was by personal 
recognition and random choice. The intent of categorizing 
was to try to obtain equal amounts of contracts from both 
large and small franchise systems in an effort to determine 
whether large franchises include more provisions in their 
contracts when compared to the smaller franchise systems.
The letters requesting copies of the contracts were 
mailed at the beginning of November, 1987. A copy of the 
letter can be found in Appendix II. Of the one hundred 
contracts requested, only twenty-six were received by the
end of the second week of February, 1988.
In the next phase, each contract was reviewed to see if
it contained some, or all of the 158 provisions outlined in 
Chapter 2. To record the presence of the provisions, a 
tally sheet was used. After making the appropriate annota­
tions to the tally sheet, the marks in each category of 
provisions were summed to determine the frequency of its 
occurrence in the collective group of the twenty-six con­
tracts. This frequency of occurrence is shown in Appendix 
III.
In addition to finding the frequency of occurrence of 
each provision, the twenty-six contracts were redefined into 
two categories of (1) nationally known, and (2) regional 
franchises.
In this study, the franchises were evenly distributed 
with thirteen contracts in each category.
19
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It was hypothesized that national franchises may be 
overcontrolling their systems by using large numbers of 
provisions in their contracts when compared to the number of 
provisions found in the regional franchises. This hypo­
thesis was tested by totalling the provisions in each con­
tract to produce a cumulative sum for each category. A 
comparison of the cumulative sum of each category would be 
made to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis.
20
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CHAPTER 4 
FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH RESULTS
The receipt of twenty-six contracts out of the one 
hundred requested, was somewhat of a disappointment. The 
non-responding franchises were either very large and well 
known, or very regional in their existence. Eleven of the 
non-respondents had very large franchise systems, and the 
remaining sixty-four were regional.
Wherein only twenty-six contracts were received, ten of 
the twenty-six franchises had participated in the original 
study. The author felt that this would provide ideal data 
to assess possible change in the contracts employed in 
franchising. To negate any bias analysis, contracts from 
the ten franchises that participated in the original study 
were not compared to contracts received in the present 
study.
Provisions in the contracts received from the fran­
chisors were compared with the same provisions in 
Dr. Udell's original study. The provisions were compared to 
ascertain any changes in the terms used in the wording of 
the provision. it was noted that contracts from the current 
and previous study used large portions of legal terminology 
in their contracts. All of the contracts contained legal 
terms in one form or another. However, ten of the thirteen
21
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less known franchise contracts had legal terminology that 
was difficult to comprehend, and they probably require the 
assistance of a lawyer to decipher their meaning. This is 
not to say that the other sixteen contracts did not have 
terms that were difficult to comprehend. Rather it iden­
tifies those ten contracts as having a substantial amount of 
legal terms that may mislead, or confuse a franchisee as to 
what performance is expected from him, or from the 
franchisor.
Understanding legal terminology was not the only 
barrier in comprehending the contract. Three of the ten 
contracts possessing large amounts of legal terms, also had 
provisions in small print. The small print was located 
about halfway through the contract in two instances. The 
entire print in the third contract was small and hard to 
read. The comparison also included reidentifying provisions 
that were considered unfair in the original study. While 15 
percent (23 of 158) of the provisions in the original study 
would definitely be considered unfair, many of the remaining 
135 provisions have the potential of being unfair if used to 
impose the absolute will of the franchisor.
À comparison was made with the 1973 study to see if the 
follow-up study would have significant differences in the 
prevalence of the provision. This comparison yielded mixed 
results. The comparison resulted in some provisions having 
a range of very little to large difference in occurrence.
Of the provisions that were significantly less, 16 percent
22
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were unfair. Of the provisions that were significantly 
more, 12 percent were unfair. Of the provisions that were 
unchanged, 25 percent were unfair. The comparison can be 
seen in Figure 1 at the end of this chapter.
Unfair Provisions 
In the original study, 15 percent of the provisions 
used were considered unfair or had the potential of being 
unfair. The present study identified five provisions that 
enhanced opportunities for unfair treatment. The five 
provisions were; Operating Manual, Lease Back, Franchisor's 
inspection. Operating Supplies-Must Buy, and Termination for 
any Violation. Each provision is shown in Appendix I. The 
provision for the operating manual binds the franchisee to 
the contents inside of the manual. At no time is the fran­
chisee allowed to review the manual prior to signing the 
franchise contract. In several provisions, there is refer­
ence to possible additional requirements as specified in the 
operating manual. It is possible to conclude that this 
condition could produce unknown hardships upon the 
franchisee. The author was unable to obtain an operating 
manual, but information from conversations with a former 
manager of a Burger King and McDonald's, indicated the 
operating manual contains very explicit instructions as to 
how the franchised store is to be operated. It was said 
that the manual would probably be the best contract the 
franchisor could use. It would provide a wealth of inform­
ation as to what performance is expected of the franchisee,
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and what services the franchisee can expect from the 
franchisor.
The lease back provision specifies that if a franchisee 
leases or owns the property he operates his business from, 
that franchisee must assign or lease the property to the 
franchisor. In the original study there were some fran­
chisors who required this type of subleasing as collateral 
for faithful performance. This provision gives the fran­
chisor a large tool in which he may threaten to evict the 
franchisee, thereby coercing the franchisee into performance 
dictated by the franchisor. Furthermore, if the franchisee 
owns the land and is forced from the business, the fran­
chisor retains the lease for the specified period of time, 
and can operate the franchise business until the end of the 
lease. The original study identified this as being one of 
the most unfair provisions.
The inspection of a franchise facility is an undoubted 
right of every franchisor. The inspections are a means of 
ensuring equipment, cleanliness, and proper standards are 
adhered to. These inspections give the franchisor the right 
to remove from the premises any supplies or equipment for 
the purpose of testing standards or quality. If equipment 
is broken during this testing, it is the franchisee who has 
to pay for repairs or replacement. There are no limits as 
to how many times a franchisor can remove items from the 
operating facility. Contracts that contained this provision 
did not specify the franchisor's responsibility in sharing
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repair and replacement costs.
All franchised businesses require operating supplies to 
function successfully. Purchasing supplies in the franchise 
restaurant business can be done through the franchisor, or 
from an independent distributor. To purchase supplies from 
an independent distributor, the supplies must meet quality 
standards met by the franchisor. If these standards are too 
high, the franchisee may be forced to buy his supplies from 
the franchisor. In a must buy situation, the franchisee is 
not given the opportunity to seek a distributor for 
supplies. Instead, he must buy all his supplies directly 
from the franchisor or through a distributor specified by 
the franchisor. This situation gives the franchisor com­
plete control in pricing the supplies sold to the 
franchisee. If the franchisee purchases through an 
appointed distributor, a surplus charge may be made so that 
the distributor may give a kickback payment to the fran­
chisor for the business rendered unto him. There can be 
situations wherein this provision is enforced to maintain 
quality supplies with reasonable prices for supplies.
The termination for any violation provision gives the 
franchisor the opportunity to terminate the franchise con­
tract for any violation, no matter how small. This provi­
sion does not give the franchisee the opportunity to correct 
the problem, or explain the circumstances if the situation 
was something he had no control over. The provision could 
become quite a tool if there is some strong resentment
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between the franchisor and franchisee.
Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that national franchises may be 
over-controlling their system by using large numbers of 
provisions in their contracts when compared to the number of 
provisions found in the regional franchises. The difference 
between the well-known versus the less-known is sixty-four 
provisions in favor of the well-known franchises. The 
average mean number of provisions found in the national and 
regional franchises was 73 and 68 respectively. The median 
for national franchises is 74, and 70 for regional 
franchises.
Because the difference is numerically small in size, 
the data shown below does not prove that the hypothesis is 
correct, nor is there conclusive evidence that the theory is 
wrong. Further study is needed to prove or disprove the 
theory. In addition, the data in Figure 2 also gives the 
reader the number of provisions each franchise contract 
possessed and the percentage of provisions found in relation 
to the 158 provisions used in the research.
In addition to comparing the original study for 
reoccurrence of questionable provisions, the current study 
was also designed to identify provisions not mentioned in 
the original study. A new provision was discovered and was 
titled in the contracts as AREA DEVELOPER. The franchised 
area developer is generally someone who builds the buildings
used to house a franchised restaurant. The area developer
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does not own the land or buildings, but contracts with a 
franchisor to build several establishments within a speci­
fied area. Usually the area developer is under a time 
constraint. The contracts for the developer do not differ a 
great deal from the food franchise except it is geared 
towards construction terminology.
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988) (Percent of contracts containing provision)
—  1973 1988
1. FRANCHISE FEE .75 .100
2. NON-REFUNDABLE FEES .00 .54
3. ROYALTY .75 .88
4. NATIONAL ADVERTISING .34 .88
5. LOCAL ADVERTISING .53 .62
6. RENEWAL FEE .09 .30
7. SERVICE FEE .16 .27
8. RENTAL/LEASE PAYMENTS .25 .31
9. RENT ADJUSTMENT .01 .04
10. PURCHASE PAYMENTS .75 .08
11. INDIRECT PAYMENTS .03 .00
12. SPECIAL PAYMENTS .27 .58
13. PENALTIES .22 .65
14. SECURITY DEPOSITS .12 .00
15. TERMINATION PENALTIES .00 .04
16. LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS .77 .88
17. OPTION TO RENEW .52 .69
18. EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY .65 .63
19. START UP DATE .11 .46
20. FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL .07 .08DISCLOSURE
21. FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL .55 .58DISCLOSURE
22. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR .56 .81
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)(Percent of contracts containing provision)
23. HOLD HARMLESS
24. ACT OF GOD
25. NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT
26. ILLEGAL COVENANT
27. LEGAL BUSINESS
28. FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION FORBIDDEN
29. RIGHT TO FUTURE REVISION
30. OPERATING MANUAL
31. GOODWILL PAYMENTS
32. CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY
33. COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS
34. FRANCHISE DISABILITY
35. ARBITRATION
36. SITE SELECTION
37. INCORPORATION PERMITTED
38. TRADEMARK RESTRICTION
39. DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE
40. GOOD ETHICS
41. STATE OF INTERPRETATION
42. VENUE CLAUSE
43. SUB-FRANCHISING
44. CIVIL RIGHTS
45. FULL TIME
1973
.61
.14
.61
.55
.14
.02
.49 
.40 
.06 
.25 
.52 
.57 
. 21 
.09 
.93 
.53 
. 28 
.04 
.97 
.27 
.64 
.01 
.15
1988
.69
.15
.73
.69
.08
.00
.77
.81
.04
.58
.58
.50
.46
.62
.88
.96
.62
.46
.73
.15
.04
.00
.35
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988) (Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973 1988
46. COMPETITIVE BUSINESS .34 .81
47. RESTRICTION ON SALE OF GOODS .02 .00
48. PRODUCT SERVICE .00 .04
49. SALES QUOTA .00 .00
50. GUARANTEED SALES .00 .00
51. PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL .33 .69
52. LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED .11 .12
53 . DAYS OPEN .53 .50
54. HOURS OPEN .52 .54
55. PRODUCT LINE .70 .77
56. PRICE CONTROL .27 .08
57. ALTERNATION APPROVAL .65 .62
58. FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP .29 .12
59. FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP .27 .19
60. FRANCHISEE LEASES . 22 .81
61. FRANCHISOR LEASES . 34 .19
62. LEASE APPROVAL . 14 .23
63. NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE .02 . 31
64. LEASE BACK .02 .27
65. LEASE LOSS .14 .42
66. ANALYZE REPORTS .29 . 31
67. ADVERTISING .20 .69
6 8 « ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING FUNDS .08 .31
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973 1988
69 . ADVISE AND CONSULT .12 .58
70. INSPECT .12 .92
71. ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF CHANGES . 34 .65
72. GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE .24 .65
73. BANK APPROVAL .05 .04
74 . BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM APPROVAL .22 . 27
75. BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM REQUIRED .49 .62
76. ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT .28 .46
77. RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS .48 .92
78. MARGIN OF ERROR .29 .69
79. INCOME TAX COPY .16 .31
80. PERIODIC REPORTS .68 .88
81. CASH WITHDRAWAL .00 .00
82. PROFIT WITHDRAWAL .09 . 00
83. EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS .41 .42
84. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT .40 . 27
85. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES .08 .04
86. RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE .06 .04
87. FRANCHISEE FORMAL TRAINING .01 .85
88. FRANCHISEE REFRESHER COURSE .12 .42
89. SUBSEQUENT MANAGER TRAINING . 19 .69
90. KEY EMPLOYEE TRAINING .19 .39
91. ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING .98 .08
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973 1.9 8.8
92. OJT AND ASSISTANCE .21 .27
93. FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION .15 .27
94. FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED .50 .85
95. CANCELLATION NOTICE .15 .73
96. APPROVAL OF COMPANY .18 .46
97. PROOF OF INSURANCE .38 .88
98. BUSINESS INTERRUPTION .01 .19
99. WORKERS' COMPENSATION .41 .69
100. PERSONAL .07 .46
101. EMPLOYER LIABILITY .18 .81
102. PROPERTY LIABILITY .67 .92
103. PRODUCT LIABILITY .77 .81
104. PAPER GOODS-MAY BUY .47 .19
105. PAPER GOODS-MUST BUY .00 .00
106. PAPER GOODS-VENDOR APPROVAL .51 .39
107. PAPER GOODS-STANDARDS .40 .81
108. OPERATING SUPPLIES - MAY BUY .48 .12
109. OPERATING SUPPLIES - MUST BUY .00 .23
110. OPERATING SUPPLIES - VENDOR .52 .39APPROVAL
111. OPERATING SUPPLIES - STANDARDS .49 .69
112. EQUIPMENT-MAY BUY .63 .27
113. EQUIPMENT-MUST BUY .00 .08
114. EQUIPMENT-STANDARDS .34 .65
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)(Percent of contracts containing provision)
1973 1988
115. SIGNS-MAY/MUST BUY .49 .12
116. SIGNS-VENDOR APPROVAL .19 .23
117. SIGNS-STANDARDS .28 .65
118. PRICE RESTRICTIONS .04 .00
119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR REBATE .02 .12
120. VENDING APPROVAL .16 .46
121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE .26 .39
ADVERTISING
122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND DESTROY .12 .50
123. SIGNS REQUIRED .54 .65
124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL .65 .62
125. ADVERTISING COMMITTEE .07 .39
126. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF FIRST .35 .85APPROVAL
127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF FIRST .04 .00APPROVAL
128. RIGHT OF INHERITANCE .32 .50
129. LIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE .00 .31
130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE .00 .00
131. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF SALE .74 .77
132. NO FOR-SALE ADVERTISING .00 .04
133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS .04 .50
134. STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL .06 .77
135. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS .00 .54
136. FAILURE TO PAY .21 .77
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FIGURE 1
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS COMPARISON (1973 VS 1988)(Percent of contracts containing provision)
137. FRANCHISEE EARLY TERMINATION
138. FRANCHISOR EARLY TERMINATION
139. TERMINATION FOR ANY VIOLATION
140. TERMINATION FOR 
VIOLATION/STANDARDS
141. TERMINATION FOR BANKRUPTCY
142. TERMINATION FOR TRAINING FAILURE
143. IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION
144. GRACE PERIOD
145. 10-DAY
146. 30-DAY
147. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE-YEARS
148. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE-MILES
149. COVENANT NOT TO HIRE
150. COVENANT NOT TO USE SYSTEM
151. COVENANT TO CEASE OPERATIONS
152. COVENANT TO CHANGE BUILDING
153. COVENANT TO REMOVE SIGNS
154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT
155. EQUIPMENT
156. SIGNS
157. TRADEMARK SUPPLIES
158. REGULAR SUPPLIES
1973 
.24 
.99 
. 00 
.05
. 30 
. 02
.42 
.66 
.00 
.00 
.62 
. 52 
.26 
.50 
.53 
.20 
.26 
.22 
. 32 
.30 
.27 
.14
1988
.35
.12
.35
.73
.85
.15
.27
.04
.39
.58
.73
.69
.15
.46
.92
.58
.65
.50
.46
.46
.46
.46
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Note; the comparison is made by taking each individualprovision and numerically identifying how many times 
it appears in the collect year group of contracts.The 1973 percentages were from one hundred twenty-two 
fast food contracts and the 1988 were from twenty-six fast food contracts.
FIGURE 2
NATIONAL REGIONAL
Total # of provisions per contract % in each contract
Total # of provisions % per contract in each contract
58 .37 24 .15
63 .40 46 .29
67 .42 61 .39
67 .42 67 .42
72 .45 69 .43
73 .46 70 . 44
74 .47 70 .44
77 .49 73 .46
77 .49 74 .47
80 .51 75 .48
80 .51 81 .53
80 .51 86 .54
82 .52 90 .57
total 950 886
Note: The symbol 
contract.
# means the The symbol %number of provisions means the percentagein each ofprovisions found in each contract in relation to the 158 provisions used in the research.
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY
This research does not offer factual evidence to refute 
or support any allegations. The function of this research 
is to provide the reader a basis of evaluating, and under­
standing franchise agreements. Opinions and/or suggestions 
made by the author are not intended to sway the reader for, 
or against, the franchisor, or franchised businesses. The 
author's intent is to identify the reoccurrence of ques­
tionable provisions identified in the original study in 
anticipation of giving the reader information about provi­
sions that may be detrimental in operating a franchised 
business.
In conclusion, there is still considerable control 
applied to franchisees through contractual provisions. 
Several provisions such as the lease-back clause, wherein 
the franchisee loses all equity if he should lose his lease 
on the land, remains questionable.
In this study, the majority of the provisions have the 
possibility of being unfair if enforced as written. In this 
study 15 percent of the 158 provisions were identified as 
being unfair according to the value judgement of Dr. Udell's 
previous research and provides the franchisor with a power­
ful tool to control an independent business person. Not all
36
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of the provisions prove to be unfair. There are some that 
should be present to insure standards and services are 
applied uniformly throughout the established franchise 
system.
What may be more alarming and still present is the ever 
elusive owner's manual. In each contract reviewed, there is 
some statement binding the franchisee to comply with the 
owner's manual. Unfortunately, the prospective franchisee 
will not be allowed to look inside this manual until he has 
signed the contract. When the manual has been reviewed, the 
franchisee may feel that he has been misled, and is now 
unable to withdraw from the contractual agreement without 
being assessed a substantial penalty.
In all of the reviewed contracts, the franchisor had 
the right to "revise" the manual. These revisions were to 
be "within reason", but not once was "within reason" speci­
fied in numerical terms. Yet the franchisee will have to 
abide by the manual as specified in the contract.
It is recommended that the franchisor provide a more 
in-depth narrative in what the owner's manual requires from 
the franchisee.
The reader should note that the terms "unfair" and 
"fair" are derivatives from Dr. Udell's previous study and 
are value judgments used in this follow-up research. What 
may be an unfair provision to the author may not be unfair 
to the reader.
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Therefore, the reader should apply his own judgmental 
values to the material he has read and decide what would be 
fair or unfair in the provisions that were presented.
Finally, the writer tried to prove a hypothesis that 
nationally known franchisors apply more control than the 
regionally established franchises. There were exactly 
thirteen national and thirteen regional franchises. The 
cumulative total of provisions from the national franchises 
numbered 950. The regional franchises' cumulative total 
numbered 886. While these figures indicate that the 
national franchisors possessed sixty-four more provisions 
than the regional franchisors, it should be noted that 
several of the regional franchises provided little guidance 
except a reference to the owner's manual. What was found 
was that smaller franchises used smaller print and more 
legal words which many people would find hard to understand.
The data gathered from this research provided incon­
clusive evidence in proving or disproving the hypothesis. 
This would be an excellent area to look into for a follow-up 
research.
Although we have seen many questionable provisions 
during the review of the contract agreements, the recent 
data gathered from business literature, newspapers, and 
television news indicate that franchising is on the rise.
This suggests that those unfair clauses are not being 
enforced or the franchisee considers the profit worth the
hassle. Either way, franchising is booming and to answer
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the question "why" requires further study into what exactly 
has changed the industry into a lucrative business.
The information in this follow-up research has indi­
cated that the provisions identified in the original study 
are still prevalent in contracts used in present day agree­
ments between franchisors and franchisees. Wherein the 
provisions are still questionable in fairness, the informa­
tion presented in the USA TODAY. 11 February 1988 edition, 
indicates franchising is on the rise. Despite the presence 
of questionable provisions identified in this follow-up 
research, if the reader has some desire to enter the fran­
chise market, he should conduct an in-depth investigation as 
to what is expected from him as a franchisor and precise 
duties of the franchisor before entering an agreement.
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APPENDIX I 
FRANCHISE PROVISIONS
The 158 franchise provisions used in reviewing the 
contractual agreements are grouped according to standard 
sections of a standard contract.
PAYMENTS TO THE FRANCHISOR
1. FRANCHISE FEE - Payment for the privilege of doing 
business using the trademarks of the franchisor is typically 
covered by a franchise fee. Franchise fees ranged from 
$9,000 to $85,000. There were two fees that were left open 
for negotiation.
In some contracts, portions of the franchise fee were 
used to defray the cost the franchisor incurred for helping 
in site location, franchisee formal training, opening day 
supervision, and construction of facilities. For the most 
part, what the franchisor receives in the franchise fee is 
profit, even though a few stated in their contracts that 
this fee defrayed the expense of getting the franchisee 
started, therefore, no monetary gain is recognized. There 
is no argument that the franchisor is entitled to the fran­
chise fee to do as he wishes.
But to create a more perfect union between the two, and 
reduce the suspicion the franchisee has of being overcharged
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for inferior service, the franchisor should specify what the 
fee is for and what areas of service the fee covers.
2. NON-REFUNDABLE FEES - This clause, for the most part, 
pertains to the franchise fee paid to the franchisor. There 
were some contracts that would allow the return of portions 
of fees paid should an individual terminate the agreement 
either prior to actually operating the business or early in 
the operation of the business.
There are some instances where the franchise fee was 
large and the franchisee would pay an initial portion upon 
signing the contract. The remaining balance would be paid 
at some specified period during the life of the contract. 
Should there be an early termination, or termination 
occurred prior to the operation of the business, it would be 
the initial payment that would not be refundable. There 
were five controls that stated that under no circumstances 
would any portion of fees paid be refunded once the contract 
had been signed. Those contracts that stipulate no refund, 
should be modified to allow refund of monies when termina­
tion occurs under circumstance beyond the franchisee's 
control.
In all fairness to the franchisor, there should be a 
deduction from the refund for actual expenses incurred 
during the operation of the franchise up to termination.
3. ROYALTY - This payment is derived from the franchisee's 
gross receipts from sales, and it is considered a payment
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for services the franchisor provides during the life of the 
contract. The franchisee is usually required to report 
gross sales to the franchisor. This report gives the fran­
chisor the tool to evaluate whether the franchisee has paid 
the correct amount of royalty payment.
In this research, the fee ranged between 2 and 8 per­
cent of gross sales. The payment is normally made on a 
monthly basis and is compounded with additional charges if 
the franchisee is late in making the payment to the 
franchisor.
Wherein this payment is designed to pay the franchisor 
for services rendered, there were no provisions in any of 
the contracts reviewed specifying stoppage of payments 
should there be a conflict in what the franchisor is to 
provide and what the franchisee is to receive in services. 
This could be a questionable practice if not modified to 
allow some protection for the franchisee if the franchisor 
does not provide the service specified in the contract. 
Otherwise, the franchisee has to continue to pay for what he 
is not getting. A viable solution would be the establish­
ment of an escrow account, wherein the franchisee would 
deposit the royalty payment if a dispute were to occur and 
neither party would have access to it until the dispute is 
settled.
4 - 5 .  NATIONAL AND LOCAL ADVERTISING PAYMENT - Many fran­
chisors take the responsibility in advertising and promoting 
the franchised business. In doing this, the franchisor
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requires participation of all franchisees in an advertising 
program.
The program is not voluntary in most cases and does 
include advertising both nationally and locally. Fran­
chisees are required to pay specified sums based upon gross 
sales to the franchisor to cover the expense of promoting 
the franchise name. It should be understood that in this 
study, all franchisees within the franchised business con­
tribute to this fund.
From the franchisor's perspective, this type of program 
provides a uniform presentation of the franchised business 
to the public. When traveling, you may see advertising 
boards by the side of the road displaying the location of 
your favorite hamburger establishment to be approximately 
two miles down the road. Being hungry and knowing the 
quality of food is good because this establishment is in 
your home town, you will probably stop there in lieu of the 
"mom and pop" cafe you just passed. Because of the national 
and regional advertising, we become familiar with the 
establishment and come to expect the same good quality 
service no matter where we are.
This is what standardization in advertising can do for 
a franchise business. Perhaps at this time many readers 
would be wondering just how the franchisor accounts for the 
advertising expenditures? Several franchisors provide 
detailed reports as to what was spent and how. This report 
format is similar to an accounting balance sheet and is
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either provided to the franchisee or readily available upon 
request. There are some franchisors that have a matching 
fund. This matching fund is essentially a one for one 
dollar deposit by the franchisor for each deposit made by 
the franchisee. Every franchisee is supposed to pay his 
equal and fair share. There are, however, some franchisors 
who do not feel it is anyone's business to know where the 
money collected from the franchisee is going or how it is 
spent. This kind of behavior has the potential of opening 
the doors of mistrust between the two parties because the 
franchisee may feel he has the right to know what he is 
spending his money for.
6. RENEWAL FEE - This payment is made by the franchisee to 
the franchisor for the renewal of the franchised business at 
the end of a specified period. The payments were sometimes 
a percentage of the original franchise fee or a set amount 
for each renewal period. Under certain circumstances where 
more than one franchise establishment was owned by a 
franchisee, franchisee would only have to pay a renewal fee 
for one franchise business and something of a token payment 
for the second and additional franchise business. The 
renewal period ranged between ten additional years to 
infinity.
7. SERVICE FEES - Service fees were generally payments for 
some service the franchisor provided to the franchisee.
This particular provision appeared in seven contracts.
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Perhaps the reason for the limited occurrence could be 
linked directly to the large franchise fees paid at the 
initial contractual agreement.
It was noted that three franchisors did state in their 
contracts that formal and OJT training were included in the 
franchise fee. These and many other types of services 
provided by the franchisor seem to be distributed throughout 
the 158 provisions making it impossible to focus the pay­
ments into Service Fees.
8. RENT OR LEASE PAYMENTS - The franchisee is given the 
option to rent or lease property, equipment, or signs from 
the franchisor within the terms of the lease or rent speci­
fied in the contract.
In this study, there was no provision requiring the 
franchisee to lease or rent from the franchisor.
Renting or leasing from the franchisor could increase 
the control the franchisor has over the franchisee. For 
example, a franchisee rents his equipment from the fran­
chisor. The franchisee is required to upgrade or change the 
equipment upon notice from the franchisor.
If the franchisee is responsible for the expense of 
this change and there is not a written agreement as to how 
many times the upgrades or changes will occur in a specific 
time period, the franchisee could be liable for several 
changes within a year. The cost of these changes could be a 
financial burden to the franchisee.
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This situation can be controlled by having a very 
descriptive clause in the initial agreement as to how often 
equipment changes or upgrades can be made by the franchisor 
in a specific time frame.
9. RENT/LEASE ADJUSTMENT - If the franchisee rents from 
the franchisor he/she could be susceptible to an increase in 
rent or lease payments. The term rent adjustment is self 
explanatory and may be considered fair or unfair depending 
on how it is administered in each individual contract. The 
franchisor has the right to adjust the payment, but the 
question of fairness rests in why there is an increase and 
how much.
The franchisor could provide an explanation and details 
to the franchisee in justifying the increase in payments. 
This sort of cooperation could create mutual respect and 
understanding from both parties since both are business 
persons in a common line of work.
10. PURCHASE PAYMENT - Under this provision, the franchisee 
may be required or given the option to purchase inventory, 
operating supplies, and/or equipment from the franchisor. 
With one exception, there were no cases of franchisees being 
required to purchase from the franchisor. The one exception 
involved required purchase of ingredients that were trade 
secret to each respective franchised business. This excep­
tion can be related to maintaining the competitive edge and 
trade secrets.
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In a financial light, the cost of the initial start-up 
could be quite large, therefore, some franchisors allowed 
installment pay periods for the initial purchase of equip­
ment , inventory, or supplies.
Others included the initial purchase cost in the 
estimate of initial capital necessary to begin the business.
On an interval type basis or as purchase becomes neces­
sary , the franchisee would have to pay for equipment, 
inventories, or supplies received from the franchisor 
according to the agreed terms which usually specified when 
the payment would have to be received.
Usually late payments incurred some percentage of 
interest for each day after the due date.
11. INDIRECT PAYMENTS - This payment sometimes involves a 
third party. The franchisee makes payments to the fran­
chisor who, in turn, makes payments to a supplier. The 
problem occurs when the franchisee has to pay extra amounts 
to reimburse the expense or gratuities the franchisor incurs 
when doing business with the supplier (third party). The 
franchisee may perceive he is being overcharged by the 
franchisor.
This practice is questionable in that the franchisor is 
the one who conducted the business between himself and the 
supplier and not the franchisee. It should be the 
franchisor who is responsible for expenses incurred in this
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exchange. Research findings indicate there was no visible 
evidence that this was a common practice.
12. SPECIAL PAYMENTS - These payments are one time payments 
for specific services provided by the franchisor, such as 
grand opening or a specific promotion. Of the 26 agree­
ments, 15 provided provisions for these types of services.
If the franchisee pays for services mentioned above and the 
franchisor fails to complete the service, the franchisor 
could refund all monies with no penalties. What the 
franchisees fear is possible termination should they demand 
the refund for non-performance by the franchisor.
If there is a question of non-performance, a system 
whereby payment is withheld and deposited into a neutral 
account should be established. With this system, the money 
has been paid. Therefore, the franchisee is not liable for 
nonpayment charges and the money will not be received by the 
franchisor until the service is done or the dispute 
resolved.
13. PENALTIES - This particular provision was levied 
against the franchisee for various reasons ranging from late 
payment to erroneous bookkeeping. Late payment penalties 
are self-explanatory. The franchisee is liable for unan­
nounced periodic inspection of the financial books. If the 
franchisee's actual gross income differs from the gross 
income reported to the home office, a penalty is assessed in 
the form of a requirement to pay all that is due to the
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franchisor, plus a percentage of interest on the amount that 
was not reported. Sometimes the percentage was based on the 
number of days the additional amount of gross income had not 
been reported. The assessment of penalties becomes ques­
tionable in the dollar amount required in fair value to the 
business and the standard assessment of these penalties 
under mitigating circumstances beyond the franchisee's 
control.
14. SECURITY DEPOSITS - This deposit deals with the initial 
start-up of the business. The security deposit was designed 
to induce faithful performance by the franchisee.
The franchisee makes the initial deposit of the fran­
chise fee with installments thereafter. Should there be 
some breach of contract, the franchisee essentially loses 
all monies in the account. At best, this provides the 
franchisor with security, but what of the franchisee?
In most cases little to nothing is mentioned in the 
event the franchisor defaults in some aspect of the con­
tract. This leaves a dispute as to what is owed to the 
franchisor.
The franchisor claims the deposit is rightfully his for 
doing business under the franchised trademarks. The fran­
chisee claims he is making payments for services not 
received. In addition to losing the deposit, there is the 
possibility the franchisee will have to pay a penalty for 
early termination.
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15. TERMINATION PENALTIES - This penalty is assessed should 
the franchisee terminate the agreement early or some viola­
tion by the franchisee causes early termination. The
termination is no more than a liquidating charge that, in
some cases, is not assessed according to the fair market 
value of the going concern.
It could be used as an ax over the franchisee's head. 
Many times early termination is unforeseen and far beyond 
the control of the franchisee. Yet, without regard to this 
fact, a penalty could be used by the franchisor to gain a 
slight profit. Fortunately, only one contract contained 
this provision.
GENERAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
16. LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS - The majority of the con­
tracts provided the length of the time the terms would be
enforced. The average time ranged between 15 to 20 years
with options to renew the contract for additional years. 
There were, however, three contracts that did not specify 
definite time periods or allowed the time span to vary 
according to negotiation. The only concern that warrants 
close evaluation deals with long-term leases and short 
contract periods, especially when the franchisee leases from 
the franchisor. In this particular situation the franchisee 
could be forced to give up his business because he is not 
given the option to renew the contract on a profitable
business. This situation can take another shape where the
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lease is short and the contract period is long. In this 
situation the franchisee could lose the business because the 
franchisor will not renew the lease.
17. OPTION TO RENEW - At the end of the contract period, 
the franchisee may be given the option to renew the agree­
ment for a specified additional number of years. The 
renewal may be under the old terms or, in most cases, the 
renewal will be made under terms that are used for current 
contractual agreements.
18. EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY - This provision is probably the 
most mutually beneficial for both franchisee and franchisor. 
Exclusive territory provides a specified area where a par­
ticular franchised business can operate without having to 
compete with a going concern from the same franchise in the 
same geographical area. The specified area is usually 
designated in writing at the initial review and signing of 
the contract. Under normal circumstances, the franchisor 
cannot breach this provision without prior permission of the 
franchisee whose area is affected. While this provision 
favors the franchisee, the franchisee should understand that 
this area is fixed and cannot be extended without prior 
permission from the franchisor.
19. START-UP DATE - Franchisors frequently require the
business to be operational by a specific date. In some
cases, if the franchisee has not opened by the specified
date, immediate termination and forfeiture of partial or all
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fees paid could occur. Franchisors can be strict in apply­
ing this provision, but allow for delays if the delay is 
requested within a reasonable time prior to the projected 
opening day.
There are some who can visualize a franchisor orches­
trating deliberate delays just to cause termination whereby 
keeping the money paid by the franchisee and possibly con­
structed facilities.
20. FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE - This clause holds 
the franchisor to a promise that he/she will not disclose 
information pertaining to the franchisee's personal finan­
cial position or business operations except when necessary 
in the conduct of business. This clause is seldom seen.
Only two contracts contained this provision.
21. FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE - There is not much 
difference with this provision and # 2 0  with the exception it 
is applied to the franchisee and is most common in the 
contractual agreement. To breach this clause more likely 
will bring about a law suit and possible fines levied as a 
penalty. The clause involves a lot of do's and don'ts the 
franchisee must adhere to. Franchisors do not have as many 
rules to abide by.
22. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR - The franchisor separates 
himself from the franchisee with the provision. The provi­
sion identifies the franchisee as his own agent and attempts 
to ensure the franchisor is not held responsible for the
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action of the franchisee. There is a question of validity 
in the franchisor's disclaimer. The franchisor cannot 
disclaim actions that were directives from the franchisor.
23. HOLD HARMLESS - The hold harmless clause is the same as 
the independent contractor, except this clause is considered 
to have a clearer definition of non-responsibility on behalf 
of the franchisor.
Throughout the research, the majority of the contracts 
had provisions to cover the entire spectrum of who is re­
sponsible for actions that may cause damage.
24. ACT OF GOD - In the event some agreed upon action could 
not be accomplished because there was an event beyond the 
control of the franchisor or franchisee that prevented the 
completion of the action, it was generally considered as an 
act of God. There was very limited application of the 
provision among the twenty-six contracts reviewed. Four 
contracts had this provision.
25. NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT - In some cases, a franchisor may 
not penalize a franchisee for some defaults of the contrac­
tual agreement. The no waiver of default provision, 
however, stipulates that if the franchisor did not penalize 
the franchisee for a previous default, the action does not 
negate a penalty for the same default in the future. The 
key issue is the "sometimes factor". Sometimes it is 
enforced and sometimes not.
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The classic application occurs when there has been 
several defaults by the franchisee and the franchisor does 
nothing. Then one day, the franchisor decides to enforce 
the provision against the previously overlooked defaults, 
which usually results in heavy penalties or termination. In 
the previous study conducted by Dr. Udell, he suggested 
registered mail be used to notify the defaulting franchisee. 
Therefore, receipt could be documented and recorded. Along 
with this suggestion, it is imperative that franchisors 
become consistent in the application of this provision if 
they are not trying to send a signal that says defaults are 
tolerated.
26. ILLEGAL COVENANT - Typically, the franchised business 
is not always located in the same state as the home office. 
By virtue of independence, each state has its own laws to 
govern business practices. Many contracts have standard 
agreements that, at times, may be invalid within the state 
the franchised business is operating. If there is a dispute 
and some part of the agreement is found to be illegal within 
the specific state, the entire agreement could possibly be 
considered invalid.
To preclude nullification of the entire contract, the 
illegal covenant provision states that if any part of the 
agreement is found to be in violation of some law, the 
remaining portions of the contract shall remain valid and 
will be enforced.
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27. LEGAL BUSINESS - This provision stipulates that the 
franchised business will engage in lawful business only.
The research found only two contracts that included this 
clause. It is believed the small occurrence of the provi­
sion may be linked to vague statements made in the Indepen­
dent Contractor and/or Hold Harmless clauses. Within these 
two clauses, many statements could be interpreted as a legal 
business provision. It would behoove the franchisor to be 
more clear in this provision.
28. FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION FORBIDDEN - Fortunately, within 
the scope of this research, no franchisors forbid group 
association of company franchisees or with franchisees 
outside the company. In fact, many encouraged group 
association through annual franchisee conventions and group 
advertising.
29. RIGHT TO FUTURE REVISION - This provision gives the 
franchisor the unlimited right to make changes in the way 
the franchisee operates the business. Normally the changes 
apply to all the stores in the franchised operation. The 
majority of the contracts reviewed specified that the 
changes would be within reason. What constitutes "within 
reason" needs to be clarified. Changes in operation some­
times mean the acquisition of new equipment. While it is 
understandable that modernization is necessary, what is 
financially timely for the franchisor may not be timely for 
the franchisee. For the more distrustful, the unlimited
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right to make changes presents the picture of total control 
by the franchisor. If contested in court, both parties may 
find it difficult to define "changes within reason". A more 
in-depth clause that provides specific limits on how many 
times changes can be made within the life of the contract 
could be a viable solution. The clause might also provide 
limits on money the franchisee has to spend on each charge. 
By doing this, mistrust and ill will can be reduced and a 
more mutually beneficial relationship established.
30. OPERATION MANUAL - Twenty-one of the twenty-six con­
tracts had provisions for the operations manual. The manual 
itself"Is the bible for operating a franchised business.
Yet it is the most obscure provision in all the contracts 
reviewed. In each contract, the franchisee was required to 
operate within the guidelines of the manual that was pro­
vided. In each franchised business, the manual and its con­
tents are secret and will be revealed only to the franchise 
manager and pertinent managing staff. Revelation of the 
manual occurs only after the franchisee has signed the 
agreement. Once the agreement has been signed, the fran­
chisee is liable for any and all requirements within the 
operation manual. This situation is equivalent to being 
blind and walking in the middle of the street in downtown 
New York City. The impression one gets is that many demand­
ing issues can be hidden within the confines of the manual. 
Failure to follow the manual provisions can result in penal­
ties or immediate termination.
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This point was made quite clear in each of the twenty- 
one contracts. There is possible danger in agreeing to 
something you have not seen! In the initial study conducted 
some ten years ago, it was thought that the passing of the 
Wisconsin Senate Bill 784, which would likely require dis­
closure of franchise agreements, would negate the secretive 
nature of the manual. The present research found the secre­
tive manual is still alive and prevalent among franchisors.
31. GOODWILL PAYMENTS - The most descriptive phrase for 
this provision is "almost nonexistent". During the opera­
tion of the franchised business, the franchisee, if success­
ful, may acquire an intangible asset known as goodwill.
Research revealed only one franchisor that made pay­
ments for goodwill. In justifying non-payment of goodwill, 
the franchisor is claiming that the franchisee is not 
entitled to said payments because the trademarks are owned 
by the franchisor. The question that may be asked by the 
franchisee is, "what good is the franchise and the trademark 
without the quality service of the franchisee?"
32. CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY - At some point in time during 
the life of the contract, the franchisee may have a "less 
than desirable" operation of the franchised business accor­
ding to the provisions of the franchisor. Typically, a 
provision allows a grace period in which the problem should 
be corrected. Normally the deficiency is discovered by a 
visiting representative of the franchise home office. A
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written or verbal notice is given and from the time the 
notice is given, the franchisee has a specified period of 
time to correct the problem. If the problem has not been 
corrected at the end of the grace period, penalties or 
termination could be assessed. In all 15 contracts, this 
provision appeared. The franchisor had the option to send a 
home office representative to the troubled business if the 
deficiency has not been corrected at the end of the grace 
period. The representative's salary, room and board is 
charged to the franchisee. The problem with this provision 
is proper notification of a deficiency and the time allowed 
for correction. Some problems may take more than 3 or 5 
days to correct due to the nature of the problem.
Most contracts were strict in citing the precise number of 
days to make the correction. Before the franchisee has to 
pay for the forced help sent by the franchisor and possible 
additional penalties, both parties should discuss the reali­
ties as to how long it takes to fix the problem.
33. COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS - Under most contractual 
agreements, the franchisee is held responsible for all 
provisions. Franchised companies were designed to branch 
out in different locales. This expansion of units puts each 
franchised business in different townships, cities and 
states. This provision relieves any conflicts between 
contractual requirements and local laws. The local laws 
take precedence.
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34. FRANCHISEE DISABILITY - Should a franchisee become 
seriously ill or die, this clause states that the franchisor 
will operate the business on behalf of the franchisee until 
a suitable replacement is found. Monies or profits earned 
during the period the franchisor runs the business is 
usually placed in a separate account except the amounts the 
franchisor needs to actually run the business. Potential 
disagreement exists in the franchisor's determination of who 
is suitable for replacing the disabled franchisee. The 
majority of contracts with this provision grant the sole 
right to the franchisor to choose who is suitable to run the 
business. This means the candidate has to meet an unspeci­
fied number of requirements known only by the franchisor.
35. ARBITRATION - Some contracts allow arbitration should 
there be some conflict between the franchisor and fran­
chisee. Most adhere to rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. All decisions of the arbitrator are final. In 
Dr. Udell's previous study, this provision was strongly 
recommended.
36. SITE SELECTION - Franchisees are required to receive 
prior approval from the franchisor before making the final 
selection in the site of the franchised business. Many 
contract provisions give the franchisor the option of 
helping franchisee select the site, but specifically make it 
clear that the franchisor is not obligated in providing this
service. Contracts that specify start up dates, usually do
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not start their counting of days toward mandatory opening 
until final site selection has been made. Implementation of 
this clause can take place prior to the actual signing of 
the contract wherein signing of the contract is delayed 
until final approval of the site is made. The second method 
of implementation occurs after signing the contract and the 
franchisee is given an average of 90 days to find and get 
final approval for a selected site. The second method 
presents a slight problem in that if a site has not been 
approved within the 90 days, there is a possibility the 
entire contract could be nullified and void unless specific 
conditions are made.
MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS
37. INCORPORATION PERMITTED - The franchisee is allowed, if 
not"encouraged to incorporate the business as long as con­
trolling interest rests with the franchisee. A list of all 
share owners is normally required to be submitted to the 
franchisor to include how many shares each shareholder owns. 
Each shareholder is held responsible for adherence to the 
contract covenants. Shareholders are required to receive 
prior consent from the franchisor before selling their 
shares.
38. TRADEMARK RESTRICTIONS - Trademarks belong to the 
franchisor and are leased/loaned to the franchisee through 
the life of the contract. This provision clarifies that the
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franchisee is licensed to use the trademark only for the 
operation of the franchised business. The trademarks cannot 
be used after termination or for business outside of the 
realm of the franchise operation without prior consent of 
the franchisor. The provision reaffirms the franchisor 
ownership of all trademarks, trade secrets, and service 
marks. It also stipulates that the franchisee cannot con­
test ownership at any time.
39. DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE - To make each franchised 
business unique and distinctive, franchisors require the 
outside of the building of occupation and inside decor meet 
layouts and color schemes specified by the franchisor. Most 
franchisors require prior approval if a franchisee wants to 
deviate from set layouts or color schemes. The provision 
also clarifies franchisor ownership to the layouts and color 
scheme, so at termination, the franchisee will not be able 
to copy or use the designs and plans.
40. GOOD ETHICS - This provision requires ethical operation 
of the business on behalf of the franchisee to the consumer. 
It has been questioned whether this provision can be 
enforced. Many feel franchisors cannot enforce this pro­
vision and it should not be entered into the actual agree­
ment if enforceability cannot be done. Most franchisees 
want a successful business and most likely will practice 
high ethical standards. The franchisor should demonstrate 
ethical behavior when dealing with the franchisee, thus per­
petuating ethical standards within the franchised business.
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41. STATE OF INTERPRETATION - This clause specifies the 
state in which the contract will be interpreted. The state 
of interpretation is usually the state in which the fran­
chisor's home office is based.
41, VENUE CLAUSE - This provision is sometimes indistin­
guishable from the preceding provision. The provision 
identifies the specific state, and at times, cities in which 
all legal matters or disputes will be heard or settled.
There are some contracts that will make a neutral location 
or the nearest arbitrator the place to settle problems.
What is unfair in this and the previous provision is when 
the franchisee has to travel to the home state of the fran­
chisor. The cost for travel is out-of-pocket money for the 
franchisee, who is not reimbursed. The neutral location is 
the best choice because each will bear the cost of some type 
of travel.
43. SUB-FRANCHISING - Within this study, sub-franchising of 
the fast food business was almost non-existent. What was 
noticed was a new type of franchising of buildings and land 
to be used for fast food franchising. If the franchisor did 
not want direct dealings in passing out franchise portions, 
he would franchise with one person and give him the 
authority to portion out the franchise business. The dealer 
is called an area franchisee. This type of splitting 
creates a middleman with whom the franchisee has to do 
business along
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with the franchisor. Communication between all three 
parties be hampered and there is some risk in the competency 
of the middleman.
44. CIVIL RIGHTS - Most contracts never address this provi­
sion because of the interpretation. Generally most fran­
chisors get around this by requiring franchisees obey all 
State, Federal and local laws.
45. FULL TIME - Franchisors require full time participation 
or best effort from the franchisee in the operation of the 
franchise business. It is understandable the franchisor 
wants successful operation of the franchise business, but 
"full time" participation may be somewhat unreasonable. 
Besides, what are assistant managers for? More realistic is 
the "best effort". It still holds the franchisee 
responsible for operation but allows flexibility for events 
like extended time for personal business.
46. COMPETITIVE BUSINESS - This provision prevents the 
franchisee from entering a business that is similar to the 
one he is already operating during the life of the contract. 
Many contracts specify that a former franchisee may not 
participate in a similar franchise business for a specific 
amount of years and/or miles from a former site. This may 
also include international businesses. At times this provi­
sion can be vague in the interpretation of what is competi­
tive business. Some may think that if one is operating a
hamburger business, and desires to open a chicken business
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within the same geographical area, the chicken business 
would be competitive because it may take some of the profit 
that would have otherwise gone to the hamburger establish­
ment. The competitive business provision needs to be 
clearly defined to preclude possible over-restriction and 
denials.
47. RESTRICTIONS ON SALE OF GOODS - This clause is included 
to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized selling of 
trade mixes and material. In the fast food business, this 
is highly unlikely because the franchisor, not the fran­
chisee distributes the trade mixes, batters and material.
The absence of the provision in any of the 26 reviewed 
contracts is indicative of this.
48. PRODUCT SERVICE - This provision outlines the terms and 
conditions under which the franchisee will honor guarantees 
bn products sold or work done by another franchisee of the 
system. This provision was not present in any of the con­
tracts reviewed.
49. SALES QUOTA - This provision requires the franchisee to 
meet and maintain a sales quota. There were no contracts 
with this provision present.
50. GUARANTEED SALES - The previous provision put pressure 
on the franchisee to maintain sales. In this provision the 
franchisor has placed himself under pressure by telling the 
franchisee, or indicating that the franchisee is guaranteed
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a certain sales volume in that particular franchise system. 
As in the previous provision, it would be highly foolish to 
make such guarantees and so none were found within the scope 
of the research.
PROVISIONS OF UNIFORMITY
51. PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL - As mentioned in the distinc­
tive architecture provision, fast food franchises normally 
require a specific design to the inside and outside of the 
facility. The provision requires the franchisee request 
permission from the franchisor to change any aspect of the 
facility in which they operate. The possible event of 
unfairness generally occurs when the franchisor withholds 
his permission without just cause or delays in giving per­
mission for the change.
52. LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED - This provision provides 
the franchisee some flexibility in making changes without 
prior approval from the franchisor. Examples of this would 
be requirements from local law or building codes where the 
franchisee has no choice but to make the change or close 
down. Although it would seem that this provision would be 
beneficial for both franchisor and franchisee, only three 
contracts contained this clause.
53 - 54. DAYS AND HOURS OPEN - Under this provision the 
franchisor specifies what hours and days the franchisee has 
to operate. A typical clause will state, "Licensee shall
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operate seven days per week during the hours of 1 0 : 0 0  a.m. 
to 11.00 p.m. Monday thru Sunday”. Operating under these 
conditions could actually cause profit loss if the fran­
chisee is made to operate the business in unprofitable hours 
or days. The decision when to operate should be left to the 
franchisee. Such directives create questions as to the 
franchisor's motives in specifying exact dates and hours the 
franchisee has to operate. The most sensible explanation 
would probably be to maximize the franchisee's sales which 
in turn increases the franchisor's royalties. Who else 
knows what is right for the business?
55. PRODUCT LINE - To ensure uniformity throughout the 
franchise system, the franchisor institutes standards in the 
preparation of the product to be sold. In the fast food 
industry this means that a home office representative visits 
a store and tests the products to ensure they meet required 
standards specified by the company's standards. The purpose 
of this provision is to maintain adequate quality in the 
product that is sold.
56. PRICE CONTROL - This provision grants the franchisor 
control in setting price on the products sold by the fran­
chisee. This condition could actually cause the business to 
fail. This condition is most unfair in not allowing the 
franchisee the chance to be competitive as deemed appro­
priate for the geographical market. Once again the motive
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for a franchisor to include this provision would be to 
maximize royalties.
57. ALTERATION APPROVAL - This provision states that the 
franchisee cannot make any addition or alteration to the 
building, parking lot of surrounding area without prior 
approval from the franchisor. While it is understandable 
that the franchisor wants uniformity in the franchise sys­
tem, this provision could be used as a tool to overcontrol 
franchisees. Great care should be exercised in the applica­
tion of this provision if it is to be mutually beneficial to 
both parties.
PROVISIONS. QILJ3CCÜPANCY
58. FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY - In this agreement, 
the franchisee may own the land and/or building. If the 
franchisee has the resources, it may be appropriate to own 
the property as it provides an additional incentive to 
succeed.
59. FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY - This agreement 
allows the franchisor the right to own the land and/or 
building. In this situation the franchisee will have to 
rent or lease from the franchisor. This, however, will 
allow the franchisor an opportunity to exert a little more 
control over the franchisee. If the franchisee is willing
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to accept the additional control, this provision could be 
more economical in the long-run.
60. FRANCHISOR LEASES PROPERTY - Frequently the franchisor 
will own the land and lease it through a third party through 
a sublease with the franchisee. The terms of the lease 
generally run concurrent with the term of the contractual 
franchise agreement. Wherein the franchisor holds the 
master lease, the franchisee may be subjected to greater 
control. However, this arrangement could also be beneficial 
to the franchisee by having the franchisor assume the risks 
involved in leasing property.
61. FRANCHISEE LEASES PROPERTY - This provision provides 
the franchisee the opportunity to lease land and/or 
buildings from a third party. The franchisor may or may not 
be part of the lease agreement.
62. LEASE APPROVAL - If the franchisee elects to lease 
property from a third party, the franchisor may insist upon 
prior approval. The franchisor generally has greater exper­
tise in evaluation terms in lease agreements which may work 
to the benefit of the franchisee. The provision can be 
unfair if the franchisor uses the provision to insert condi­
tions in the lease agreement that would be unfavorable to 
the franchisee.
63. NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE - In addition to requiring 
franchisor approval of the franchisee's lease, the franchise
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agreement may also require the lessor (franchisee) to notify 
the franchisor of any lease violation. A similar clause 
provides that the franchisor may correct the lease violation 
at the franchisee's expense and, in some cases, without his 
approval. If the franchisee fails to reimburse the fran­
chisor, the franchise agreement can be terminated. This 
provision should be included whenever the franchisee holds 
the lease. In addition, the same privilege should be 
extended to the franchisee when the franchisor holds the 
lease.
j64. LEASE BACK ARRANGEMENTS - This provision specifies that 
JLt the franchisee either owns or leases the property from a 
third party, the franchisee will either assign the lease or 
lease the property to the franchisor. The terms and condi­
tions of this provision may vary. A variation of this 
provision requires "assignment of said lease or sublease 
which shall be held by the franchisor as collateral for the 
faithful performance by franchisor of . . . the covenants of 
the franchise a g r e e m e n t " S u c h  assignment permits the 
franchisor, at its option, to assume the franchisee's posi­
tion thereunder; and the lessor may rely upon the 
franchisor's written statement that it has done so without 
confirmation by the franchisee.
Lease back arrangements are among the most potentially 
unfair of all the provisions found in franchise agreements.
It seems the purpose of this agreement is to increase 
the franchisor's control over the franchisee. The fran-
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chisor can use the provision to increase his control by 
threatening to evict the franchisee from the premises which 
the franchisee owns or leases. The franchisor may elect to 
take over the operation and continue payments under the 
terms of the lease. This provision should be totally elimi­
nated from contract agreements.
65. LEASE - LOSS - If the franchisee violates or loses his 
leasey the franchisor may terminate the agreement, according 
to this provision. In effect, this provision makes the 
lease a part of the franchise agreement. In some cases, 
termination of the agreement is immediate upon the loss of 
the lease. The franchisee is not given the opportunity to 
find another suitable location. Under such terms the fran­
chise is valid for only one location and upon loss of that 
location, the franchise relationship is ended.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRANCHISOR
6 6 . TO ANALYZE REPORTS - The franchisor agrees to analyze 
the franchisee's reports and to advise him of any deviations 
from the norm. If the franchisor requires the franchisee to 
submit regular reports, the franchisor should be required to 
analyze those reports and make a report of the analysis to 
the franchisee. This information can be extremely valuable 
to the franchisee who wishes to improve his operation. 
Needless to say, analyzing the reports would probably occur
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without this provision. The value of this provision is the 
requirement of the franchisor to report his findings.
67. TO ADVERTISE - This provision states that the fran­
chisor agrees to advertise on behalf of the franchisee. The 
franchisor can stipulate that the franchisee has no right, 
claim, or interest of any kind in or to any advertising fee 
paid to the franchisor. In other cases the franchisor may 
agree to allocate the fee paid by the franchisee on a 
reasonable basis for the promotion of the System for the 
benefit of all franchisees. Allocation may be determined by 
percentage of gross sales based on the number of franchisees 
in the System.
6 8 . TO ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING FUNDS - Under this agree­
ment, the franchisor has to account for the expenditure of 
all advertising fees paid by the franchisee. The terms 
generally require the franchisor to report to the franchisee 
on a regularly scheduled basis. This agreement may specify 
how the funds may be spent, i.e., for national or regional 
advertising.
69. TO ADVISE AND CONSULT - Many franchisors agree to 
advise and consult with the franchisee on the operation of 
the franchise business. Some agreements place specific 
limits on the number of requests that can be made by the 
franchisee and areas advice can be given. Franchisees may
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be required to reimburse franchisors when consultation 
sessions exceed the allotted number.
70. TO INSPECT - This clause requires the franchisor to 
inspect the franchisee's operation. Some provisions require 
the franchisor to give the franchisee a written notice of 
findings while other allow verbal notice. If this clause 
did not exist, in all probability the franchisor would 
inspect the operation anyway. The difference is that with 
this provision the franchisor gives formal results.
71. TO ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF CHANGES - This provision states 
that the franchisor will make available to a franchisee all 
services, facilities, privileges made to all other 
franchisees, keep the franchisee advised of all new develop­
ments, improvements and innovations in methods, processes 
and systems. While this provision has no inherent unfair­
ness, it is the Operations Manual that often receives these 
changes. This clause could be potentially detrimental by 
giving the franchisor unlimited latitude to make changes or 
no changes at all, thus limiting the franchisee's competi­
tiveness.
72. GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE - Franchise agreements may 
specify that the franchisor provide grand opening assistance 
to the franchisee. To the new franchisee, the opening day 
may be most critical. If the franchisor does not provide 
support at this time, the relationship may be permanently
damaged. The franchisor may bear the cost of supplying the
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assistance or the franchisee may be required to pay for the 
help. Many contracts extracted the cost of assistance from 
the initial franchise fee. Most provisions of this type are 
vague in outlining the number of days and hours assistance 
will be provided at no cost to the franchisee.
It would be best if the franchisor stated exact daily 
or hourly rates to be charged. Unfortunately, many fran­
chisors promise assistance and do not execute their promise. 
The franchisee is then forced to accept non-compliance or 
take legal action.
BOOKKEEPING PROVISIONS
73. BANK APPROVAL - A few franchise agreements require that 
the franchisee must use a bank designated by the franchisor. 
The franchisee may be required to deposit all daily receipts 
of the business in a bank designated by the franchisor. In 
this review, only one franchisor applied this provision.
74. BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM APPROVAL - If a franchisee desires 
to implement a bookkeeping system of his own or the fran­
chisor has not designated one, the franchisee has to let the 
franchisor review the system for approval prior to using the 
system. Some agreements only require the franchisee use a 
system in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles.
75. FRANCHISOR BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM REQUIRED - The franchisee 
is required to use a bookkeeping system determined by the
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franchisor. The provision should not be considered unreas­
onable if the purpose is to facilitate the analysis of the 
franchisor's operation. But if the system does not play an 
integral role in helping the franchisee to manage his fran­
chise# the provision is questionable.
76. ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT - Many franchisors require their 
franchisees to submit certified audits of their records on 
an annual or bi-annual basis. This agreement does two 
things? it forces the franchisee to keep some form of 
records, and secondly, it reduces the opportunity for the 
franchisee, to understate his sales to the franchisor.
77. RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS - This provision gives the fran­
chisor the right to audit the books of the franchisee. Some 
agreements set the frequency of audits as "at any time"; "at 
any reasonable time"; or "during the normal business hours 
of the franchisee's operation". This provision is 
reasonable as long as the audits are not a form of harassing 
the franchisee.
78. MARGIN OF ERROR - Certain penalties are doled out if 
the records are found in error compared with the report 
submitted by the franchisee. The error can be defined as a 
fixed amount or a percentage of what was reported to the 
franchisor. If the franchisee's records are found to be 
over the specified amount or percentage, he usually is 
required to pay all unpaid royalties with interest for the 
days the unpaid portion was outstanding. Repeated negli-
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gence on the part of the franchisee is a substantial viola­
tion of the agreement and could be grounds for termination.
79. FEDERAL INCOME TAX COPY - This provision forces the 
franchisee into supplying the franchisor a copy of his 
federal income tax return. Some agreements may specify that 
only the portion of the tax return pertaining to the fran­
chised business be furnished to the franchisor. This provi­
sion is based on the assumption that some franchisees may 
attempt to cheat the franchisor but be reluctant to lie to 
the Internal Revenue Service. The agreement has caused some 
controversy because many franchisees feel that their per­
sonal financial matters are private. According to the 
Internal Revenue Service, there is nothing illegal about 
this provision because the individual is free to do as he 
pleases with his copy of the tax return.
80. PERIODIC REPORTS - Franchisors frequently require the 
franchisee to submit monthly profit and loss statements, 
sales reports, balance sheets, inventory reports, etc. From 
the franchisor's point of view, these reports are essential 
in evaluating the franchisee's progress. On the other hand, 
the franchisee may feel some discontent because it seems the 
reports are the result of the franchisor's failure to 
properly analyze the already required reports and communi­
cate their result back to the franchisee.
81 - 82. CASH AND/OR PROFIT WITHDRAWAL - This provision 
limits the amount of cash and profits that the franchisee
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may take out of his franchised business within a specific 
period of time. This provision was not found in any of the 
contracts reviewed.
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND TRAINING
83. EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS - Most common in the fast food 
industry is the desire for uniformity within the company 
system. The employee's uniform must conform to the 
specified color and design set by the franchisor. The 
franchisee is responsible for providing the uniform to all 
employees. Many contracts will designate this clause while 
others are vague or say very little at all. Most often, the 
franchisee will find that employee uniforms are mentioned in 
the operations manual and not within the contract pro­
visions. This is unfair since the franchisee will not see 
the manual until after he has signed the agreement. The 
franchisor should state all provisions within the contract 
and not give the franchisee additional requirements hidden 
in a document not furnished during the initial signing of 
the agreement.
84. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT - This clause simply relates to how 
the franchisee and his employees will conduct themselves 
while on duty. For example, the franchisor will state "the 
employee shall at all times while on duty represent a neat 
and clean appearance and render competent, sober, and cour­
teous service". There are some provisions that venture in 
the arena of ethical behavior. The trouble with these types
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of agreements is the interpretation of what or how clean is 
clean. What meter does one use to gauge competent service?
85. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES - Some franchisors retain the right 
to specify the number of employees that must be on duty at 
any time. There are some franchisors who think their fran­
chisee may reduce the number of employees on duty to cut 
costs and that such cost cutting would result in poor ser­
vice. It should be understood that good service is not 
guaranteed just because there is a full staff on duty. It 
would be most unfair to require the franchisee to maintain a 
staff larger than necessary.
8 6 . RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE - This provision provides that 
the franchisor may dismiss the franchisee's employees. In 
some cases this right is extended to the hiring of employees 
as well. Another contract requires the franchisee to con­
sult with the franchisor on hiring of employees. This 
provision is most demeaning to the franchisee. If one is 
running a business, he/she has the right to hire and fire as 
they see fit.
87. FRANCHISEE FORMAL TRAINING - The majority of the con­
tracts require formal training of the franchisee prior to 
actual operation of the business. This provision normally 
states the location, length of time, and conditions under 
which the training will be administered. There may be somé 
stipulations to this provision regarding completion of the 
formal training by the franchisee. Some agreements will
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specify, "If the franchisee fails to complete the formal 
training, a competent individual will be designated to 
attend the formal training and this individual will manage 
the franchised business". Franchisees may have to pay for 
travel and meals in most cases, but the training itself is 
part of the package deal. Some contracts will use some of 
the franchise fee as payment for the training, but the 
franchisee bears the travel and lodging expense. There are 
a few agreements that are extreme and stipulate termination 
if the franchisee fails the formal training.
8 8 . REFRESHER COURSE - This provision requires the 
franchisee to attend a refresher course similar to the 
initial formal training or to attend periodic conferences 
sponsored by the franchisor. The franchisee pays for 
travel, food and lodging, and sometimes the franchisee is 
required to pay fees for guest speakers.
89. TRAINING OF SUBSEQUENT MANAGERS - Frequently, the 
franchise agreements provide that if the manager of a 
franchise operation is replaced, the replacement manager 
will attend the formal training course. Once again, the 
franchisee is responsible for all salary, travel, and 
lodgings expenses- In addition, the franchisee may be 
required to reimburse the franchisor for training expenses.
90. TRAINING OF KEY EMPLOYEES - This provision mirrors the 
previous one, except it pertains to those personnel who
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would be considered key figures in the operation of the 
business.
91. ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING - This agreements requires the 
franchisee to train all employees. In most systems, the 
employees are not required to attend formal training. 
Instead, a training program in operation of the business may 
be given at the actual location of business.
92. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE - Some franchisors 
do not require their franchisees to complete a formal 
training program, but instead provide on-the-job training. 
Such training may take place at the franchisee's place of 
business, at company headquarters, or at any company owned 
operation designated by the franchisor.
INSURANCE PROVISIONS
93. FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION - This provision makes the 
franchisor responsible for ascertaining that the franchisee 
has adequate insurance. Under the terms of this provision 
the franchisor may procure and maintain insurance for the 
franchisee at the franchisee's expense. If the franchisor 
is in a position to benefit financially by administering the 
franchisee's insurance programs, there is a conflict of 
interest, and an unfair situation may exist. However, since 
there are other methods of ascertaining that the franchisee 
is adequately insured, this provision is not recommended. 
Group insurance can be administered by the insurance company
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and should be free from franchisor intervention.
94. FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED - Frequently the franchise agree­
ment requires the franchisee include the franchisor as an 
additional policy holder at the option of the franchisor. 
Generally the franchisor is given the right to designate and 
determine the type of insurance policies and the coverage 
there under which the franchisee shall purchase to protect 
the interests of the franchisee and franchisor. This 
protects the franchisor in the event that he is named in any 
lawsuit rising out of the franchisee's contact with 
customers. Some franchisors may compensate the franchisee 
for the additional expenses. However, in either case, the 
provision appears to be fair, reasonable, and justifiable.
95. CANCELLATION NOTICE - This agreement requires the 
franchisee to include a requirement of notice to the fran­
chisor of any violation or any termination of the 
franchisee's insurance. The franchisee's insurance company 
may be required to provide from five to thirty days' notice 
to the franchisor. Should the franchisee default on the 
insurance, some agreements give the franchisor the authority 
to make premium payments and/or procure and maintain the 
insurance. This provision is an effective method of guaran­
teeing that the franchisee maintains a proper level of 
insurance. Cancellation notices are superior to actual 
administration of the franchisee's insurance because there
is little question of a conflict of interest.
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96. APPROVAL OF FRANCHISEE'S INSURANCE COMPANY - Terms of 
provision require the franchisee to obtain insurance from a 
company the franchisor approves. As long as the fran­
chisor's approval is limited to approving the insurance 
company according to stated and recognized standards, such 
as Best's "AAA", the provision is fair.
97. PROOF OF INSURANCE - Some franchisors require the 
franchisee furnish proof that he has obtained the required 
insurance. This provision is frequently used in lieu of 
franchisor administration of the franchisee's insurance 
program. Proof of insurance requirements often accompanies 
provisions dealing with cancellation notices and administra­
tion. This provision requires less administration by the 
franchisor and exerts less control than direct administra­
tion, yet it accomplishes the same objective.
-9:3 - 1 0 3 . TYPES OF INSURANCE - This provision requires the 
franchisee to keep in force several types of insurance, 
including business interruption. Workers' Compensation, and 
personal, employer, property, and product liability 
insurance. The amounts and types vary from one contract to 
another. While there is some possibility that the 
franchisor may require the franchisee to be overinsured, 
required insurance is in the best interest of both parties. 
PURCHASING
This group of provisions is concerned with the conditions 
and circumstances under which the franchisee purchases the
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various products and supplies needed for the operation of 
the franchise. There are several conditions that may be 
optional or mandatory when purchasing items. Some fran­
chisors will make it clear that they are not a supplier, but 
supplies the franchisee purchases must meet standards set by 
the franchisor. Some franchisors give the franchisee the 
option to purchase supplies from the home office, or seek an 
independent dealer, so long as the supplies meet company 
standards. Other franchisors require the franchisee to buy 
all supplies from the home office. This last condition, 
although not unethical, can be and sometimes is no more than 
an opportunity for the franchisor to profit from the pur­
chases made by the franchisee. As this could become a 
conflict of interest, the franchisor should be careful that 
he/she is not profiteering at the franchisee's expense. To 
eliminate distrust, conditions where the franchisee must buy 
from the franchisor should be totally banned from the 
agreement. The exception would be when the item is a unique 
specialty such as batter and mixes.
104 - 107. PAPER GOODS - Paper goods include all the 
specialty paper products used in quantity by the franchisee. 
Normally, these products carry the identification of 
the franchise system. They include paper cups, plates, and 
napkins used in the fast food operation.
108 - 111. OPERATING SUPPLIES AND SERVICES - Operating 
supplies and services are products and services used by the
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franchisee on a daily basis to provide his customers with 
the products or services appropriate to his franchise.
While some operating supplies may be common to almost all 
franchisees, others may be restricted to a single franchise 
system, i.e. special spices and branded products. These are 
known as common and specialized products, respectively.
Between the two extremes are the relatively stand­
ardized products or services used by most of those engaged 
in providing the same type of products or services.
112 - 114. EQUIPMENT - The franchisee's equipment needs may 
also be divided into common, specialty, or standardized 
equipment needs. Some franchise systems have been construc­
ted around an equipment package manufactured or sold by the 
franchisor. These items may be classed as specialty 
equipment. Branded products which are not unique to the 
system, may be categorized as either standardized or common 
equipment needs.
115 - 117. SIGNS - Signs include indoor and outdoor display 
and sales promotion devices which are permanent or semi­
permanent. They, too, may be grouped according to the 
preceding three-way classification system. Most signs 
are custom-made for à particular franchise system and can be 
classed as either custom or standardized.
118. PRICE RESTRICTION - If the franchisee is required to 
purchase common or standardized goods from the franchisor or 
his designated suppliers, the franchise agreement may
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contain a provision limiting the prices and pricing policies 
of the franchisor. The purpose of this provision is to 
reduce the possibility that the franchisor will use his 
position to charge the franchisee higher prices than can be 
justified.
119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR REBATES - Most franchise agreements 
are silent on the issue of franchisor-vendor rebates. The 
rebate is somewhat like a kickback from the supplier to the 
franchisor when the franchisee buys the vendor's supplies. 
The rebate may tempt some franchisors to make their 
franchisee purchase higher priced goods, thus a larger 
rebate. The franchisor's practice of taking rebates needs 
to be eliminated because it creates an opportunity for the 
franchisor to take unfair advantage of the franchisee.
120. VENDING APPROVAL - This provision requires franchisor 
approval for the installation of vending machines on the 
premises of a franchised establishment.
The agreements specify what percentage of the vending 
income is to go to the franchisor and the vending company. 
Other agreements may require the franchisee to include the 
vending income in the gross receipts of the franchise 
business thus be subject to any royalty payments based on a 
percentage of sales.
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ADVERTISING
121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE ADVERTISING - The franchisor may 
exert partial or total control over all of the franchisee's 
advertising or a portion of it. The franchisor may also 
allow the franchisee total advertising freedom. Generally, 
the franchisor is better qualified than the franchisee to 
plan and carry out national, and perhaps local, advertising 
programs. In some agreements, the franchisor and franchisee 
may share responsibility in both concepts and financial 
contributions of the advertising program. The franchisor 
may apply a one-for-one dollar contribution for each dollar 
the franchisee applies to advertising. The franchisor may 
let the franchisee design his own regional advertisement and 
submit it for approval by the franchisor.
122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND DESTROY - This provision gives the 
franchisor or his agent the right to enter a franchised 
establishment and remove any advertisements considered 
objectionable without being charged with trespassing or 
having to pay for what was removed. This provision is one 
of the most high-handed and offensive provisions found in 
franchise agreements. While the impact of this provision is 
relatively minor, the negative effect upon the franchisee's 
mind could be considerable.
123. SIGNS REQUIRED - We have all seen the signs inside and 
outside our favorite fast food establishment. Generally,
all franchisees are required to have these signs constructed
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to dimensions specified by the franchisor. The franchisee 
may have to purchase the signs from the franchisor or, given 
the option, to purchase signs from an independent dealer.
If the franchisee wishes to use a substitute sign, he/she 
must have prior approval from the franchisor.
124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF ADVERTISING - Franchisees may be 
given the freedom to prepare their own advertising, but may 
be required to first obtain the franchisor's approval. 
Because much local advertising is multi-market in its reach, 
this provision appears to be appropriate under normal 
conditions. Thus, some coordination would seem to be in 
order. Provisions of this type should carry the condition 
that franchisor approval will not be unreasonably withheld.
125. ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF COMMITTEE - This provision 
stipulates that the franchisee must join either a national 
or regional advertising committee or association. The 
provision may also outline the respective roles that the 
franchisor, the committee, and the franchisee will play in 
carrying out the system's advertising program. Programming 
through participation may be the best approach to central­
ized advertising. Unfortunately, only a few franchisors 
have learned that participation management can be a highly 
effective way to centralize advertising and to develop a 
sense of involvement on the part of the franchisee. If the 
franchisor alone is responsible for all advertising, he is
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open to criticism and ill feeling. Active participation can 
increase communication and do much to reduce ill feelings.
PROVISIONS OF SALE OR TRANSFER
126. FRANCHISOR'S RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL - Both the 
franchisee and the franchisor may be given the right of 
first refusal in the franchise agreement. Under the terms 
of the franchisor's right of first refusal, if the 
franchisee wishes to sell his franchised business, he must 
first offer to sell to the franchisor. In addition to these 
terms, the right of refusal may also state that, "In the 
event that the franchisor shall not exercise its option for 
purchase as herein provided . . . "  the franchisee may sell 
to a third party provided that he/she has had approval of 
the sale from the franchisor. The franchisee may be 
required to give notice to the franchisor of any offer to 
sell. Included in this notice is the name, address, and all 
terms and conditions of a bona fide offer. If the 
franchisor is willing to match any bona fide offer from a 
third party, including goodwill payments, there does not 
appear to be anything unfair about this provision.
127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL - If the franchisor
wishes to establish an additional franchise within the
franchisee's exclusive territory or within a territory
stated in the franchise agreement, this provision may
specify the conditions under which the franchisor may issue
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a new franchise, the price of the new franchise, the terms 
and conditions of the sale, and the protected territory of 
the original franchise. However, the criteria upon which 
the new franchise unit is justified should be reasonable. 
Unfortunately, this does not always appear to be the case.
In some cases franchisees are forced to open new franchises 
where they are not warranted.
128 UNLIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - Under this provision, 
if the franchisee dies, his heirs have virtually an 
unlimited right of inheritance to the franchise business.
The franchisor, however, may require the heir enter into a 
written agreement with the franchisor under the current 
contract conditions. This interferes with the original 
purpose of the provisions because the business is not in­
herited as is, but under a new contract as if the heir is a 
new franchisee. Other agreements allow inheritance as long 
as it is limited to members of the franchisee's family. In 
some cases, gifts or transfers by reason of death are not to 
be considered a transfer or assignment, thus not requiring 
fees for transfers. The basic question appears to be, do 
both the franchisor and franchisee have rights that should 
be protected in the event of the franchisee's death? The 
question does cause conflict, but if the heirs are competent 
managers or can hire competent managers, they should be 
permitted to inherit the franchised business.
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129. LIMITED RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - This provision is the 
same as the preceding one except the heirs have to pay a 
transfer fee or receive the franchisor's approval, thus 
limiting the right of inheritance.
130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE - As the provision title indi­
cates some franchisors state flatly that the franchisee's 
heirs have no right to inherit the business because the 
agreement is a personal one between the franchisor and 
franchisee. Some agreements state that the heir must sell 
the operation to the franchisor at the franchisor's option. 
Most franchisees find this provision objectionable. It 
strips the franchisee of the right to pass the business 
along and forces the heir to sell the business to the fran­
chisor at a price possibly below market value.
131. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF APPROVAL OF SALE - If the fran­
chisee has an opportunity to sell his franchise, he may be 
required to obtain the franchisor's approval of the prospec­
tive buyer. The franchisor may further stipulate that the 
purchaser be reputable and financially responsible and 
complete the company training program. Some require the 
franchisee pay a sum to defray the franchisor's expenses 
incidental to the transfer of the franchise and the training 
of the new franchisee. Ironically, there is practically no 
franchisee right of first approval of sale. Many fran­
chisors are silent on this point, in fact most state that 
the franchisor has the right to sell the franchise system
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any time he/she chooses. There seems to be a conflict of 
interest. If the franchisee is to have his freedom, the 
franchisor must be restricted. On the other hand, if the 
franchisor's rights are totally protected, the franchisee 
must suffer. A compromise is in order. In addition, if the 
franchisee has to gain approval, the approval should not be 
unreasonably withheld.
132. NO FOR SALE ADVERTISING - Under this provision the 
franchisor prohibits the franchisee from making any public 
offer to sell, transfer, assign, lease, or sublet of the 
franchise business through any medium of public advertising. 
Many franchisees feel this provision is unfair in that it 
lowers the selling price to the franchisor under the right 
of first refusal because the franchisee cannot advertise for 
a competitive price for the business.
133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS - If the franchisor wishes to 
sell his franchise to a third party, that person is gener­
ally bound by the terms of the franchise agreement. This 
may also apply to the heirs of the franchisee. In some 
cases, either the heir or the purchaser may be required to 
sign a current franchise agreement. This provision is a 
just and perhaps an essential protection of the franchisor's 
rights. There seems to be no chance for this provision to 
be used in an unfair manner. It may be included at the 
franchisor's option.
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134, STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL - This provision sets forth the 
conditions under which the franchisee may assign an interest 
in the franchise or transfer stock if the franchisee has 
incorporated his business. In some cases the franchisee may 
transfer up to ten percent of the stock or interest in the 
franchise without approval, while other agreements state 
that transfer is allowable as long as the franchisee has the 
controlling interest of 51 percent. Still other contracts 
require franchisor prior approval before any portion of 
stock or interest is transferred. Most franchisors require 
a list of all stockholders and that the stockholders sign an 
agreement hot to compete.
125. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS - Should the franchisee elect or 
be forced to sell the franchise or its physical assets to 
the franchisor, this provision stipulates that the 
franchisee is prohibited from including payment of goodwill 
in the selling price. This provision may be implied and not 
specifically stated in the contract. It is obvious that the 
purpose of this agreement is to reduce the repurchase price 
of an ongoing franchise.
CONDITIONS AND TERMS OF TERMINATION
136. FAILURE TO PAY - Under this provision, many franchisees 
agree to pay all bills, debts and financial obligations. 
Should the franchisee violate the agreement to pay, it is 
considered a material breach of the contract and grounds for
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termination. if strictly interpreted, this provision may be 
used to cut off the franchisee's defense of withholding 
payments from his franchisor in case of non-performance on 
the part of the franchisor. The provision may even be 
extended to the franchisee's suppliers in some contracts. 
This is an unfair provision because it eliminates the fran­
chisee's most effective tool for correcting inequities.
137 - 138. FRANCHISEE-FRANCHISOR RIGHT TO EARLY TERMINATION
The right to terminate the franchise agreement is sometimes 
extended to the franchisee. This provision states the 
conditions and terms under which the franchisee may ter­
minate the contract. In some cases the franchisee's right 
is relatively unrestricted. In other cases the franchisor 
may specifically deny the franchisee's right to early ter­
mination. In these types of cases, the franchisee's ter­
mination may be treated as a default. Generally, if the 
franchisee desires to terminate the contract, he is subject 
to numerous conditions pertaining to the termination. On 
the other hand, the franchisor is also allowed to terminate 
the contract early, but with fewer stipulations applied 
compared with the franchisee. There is a marked difference 
between the franchisee's and the franchisor's right to early 
termination. Some franchisee termination provisions can be 
about 2 2 percent of the entire contractual agreement, while 
the franchisor's termination provisions in some contracts 
take up 48 percent of the entire contract. The franchisee
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may be required to give a thirty day notice of early ter­
mination and in most contracts ̂ the franchisor does not have 
to give any notice at all. This provision provides the 
right of early termination to both parties, but the 
franchisor is not required to give the same notices or be 
subject to the same stipulations as the franchisee. To make 
the entire provision fair, the franchisor should have the 
same requirements as the franchisee.
139. TERMINATION FOR ANY VIOLATION - This provision gives
the franchisor the unlimited right to terminate the contract 
for any violation, large or small, that the franchisee 
commits. This provision may disallow discussions or com­
promises. The franchisee is given no course to redress the 
issue, one is given no chance to make corrections. Termina­
tion can be for any violation of one or more of the provi­
sions previously reviewed. If tested in a court of law, 
such provisions may prove to be unenforceable.
Even if this provision is not used against the 
franchisee, its presence in the agreement is unfair and
undesirable for two reasons. First, the franchisor may use
the threat of termination to force his will upon the 
franchisee. Second, franchisees may feel oppressed and 
threatened by the presence of such a provision.
140 - 143. TERMINATION FOR BANKRUPTCY, VIOLATION OF 
STANDARDS, TRAINING FAILURE - These provisions provide the 
means of termination should the franchisee become bankrupt.
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or violate set standards. The franchisee is usually not 
terminated for one violation of set standards. Normally, 
the franchise is guilty of several violations. Termination 
due to failing the training program is not common since most 
franchisors require the prospective franchisee assign an 
alternate person should the franchisee fail the training 
program. This provision can be unfair if the franchisor 
does not specify the exact conditions and terms under which 
the franchisee may be terminated.
144 - 146. IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION AND GRACE PERIOD - Under 
this provision, the franchisor can terminate the franchise 
agreement without prior notice or without the benefit of a 
grace period. In some cases, immediate cancellation is 
sometimes limited to specific events or violations. The 
grace period is the amount of time the franchisee has to 
correct a deficiency after notification of violation before 
the franchisor can terminate the agreement. The length 
varies from sixty days to twenty-four hours. This provision 
is unfair in that the franchisee should have the right to an 
appeal. Under this provision, the franchisee has no such 
right.
FRANCHISEE OBLIGATION AFTER TERMINATION
147 - 148. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE - When the franchisee's 
agreement has been terminated, this provision stipulates 
that the franchisee will not engage in a similar business
for a stated period of time and/or within a stated distance
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from his former franchise business. The distance may range 
from one to fifty miles and the time from one to ten years. 
While it does not seem to be unreasonable for the franchisor 
to receive protection from the direct competition of former 
franchisees, this provision may strip the franchisee of his 
means to a livelihood. This provision may not be enforce­
able in a court of law since it does strip the former fran­
chisee of some possible livelihood. Besides, the franchisor 
has no more right to this kind of protection than any other 
businessman whose employees leave to enter a competitive 
business.
149. COVENANT NOT TO HIRE - This provision deals most with 
business ethics. It states that if some other franchise 
terminates within the system, the franchisee will not hire 
the employees or agents of either the franchisor or other 
franchisee. This is understandable if employee stealing is 
to be averted. The provision may be enforced during the 
life of the agreement, not just at termination.
150. COVENANT NOT TO USE SYSTEM - This provision is similar 
to the covenants not to compete. However, it is somewhat 
more limited in scope. Whereas a covenant not to compete 
may forbid the franchisee to engage in a similar business, 
this covenant specifically prohibits the franchisee from 
using the franchisor's system. Note that this provision 
does not prohibit the franchisee from opening a similar, but
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independent business or from joining another, but similar, 
franchised system.
151. COVENANT TO CEASE OPERATIONS - If the franchise agree­
ment is terminated for any reason, this provision may 
require that the franchisee cease all operations imme­
diately. Coupled with an immediate cancellation clause or a 
very short notice of termination, this provision is 
extremely harsh on the franchisee and his/her employees. 
However, if the franchisee has had a proper thirty day 
notice, this provision is less harsh giving the franchisee 
the opportunity to liquidate or adjust his operation and/or 
allow his employees to look for employment elsewhere.
152. COVENANT TO CHANGE BUILDINGS - After termination, the 
franchisee may be required to change the color scheme, 
layout or interior furnishing to reflect no association with 
the former franchise business. Normally the franchisee is 
given a specific time limit to make these changes after 
termination.
153. COVENANT TO REMOVE SIGNS - Under the terms of the 
covenant, the franchisee agrees to cease using any trade­
marks, service marks, emblems, displays or advertisements 
with the franchisor's name imprinted on them upon termina­
tion. The franchisee also agrees to remove any of the items 
mentioned above from the premises. This provision appears 
to be fair and appropriate, provided that the party respon­
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slble for the termination pays the cost of removing the 
signs.
154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT - This provision provides that if 
the franchisee defaults or fails to satisfactorily perform 
any of the preceding covenants, the franchisor may cure any 
such breaches at the franchisee's expense. If the agreement 
has been fairly terminated, provisions of this type appear 
to be relatively reasonable. There is, however, one excep­
tion. If the franchise agreement has been terminated by the 
franchisor,for reason of franchisor non-performance, this 
provision and the preceding covenants should not apply. The 
franchisor^, by his act of non-performance should forfeit his 
right to these protections.
PROVISIONS OF SALE AFTER TERMINATION
Frequently, the franchise agreement will specify that 
after termination the franchisee may or must sell specified 
physical assets to the franchisor. In some cases these 
provisions permitted the franchisor to purchase the fran­
chisee's on-going business by purchasing the physical 
assets. For example, if the franchisor holds the master 
lease or the lease is assignable, the franchisor may pur­
chase the equipment, signs, and supplies of a terminated 
franchise and continue the operation.
155 - 158. THE BUY BACK PROVISIONS - These final provisions 
are sometimes referred to as "buy back" clauses because they
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set the terms and conditions under which the franchisor may 
purchase the physical assets of a terminated franchise.
Some "buy back" clauses are all-inclusive and can be fair or 
unfair. The assets can be all or portions of equipment, 
signs, trademark supplies, or re^lar supplies. Financial 
terms may be from book value, straight line depreciation, 
fair market value or double declining balance in estab­
lishing selling price. Many contracts give the franchisor 
the right to deduct any portion the franchisee owes to the 
franchisor from outstanding debts. Since the franchisor 
sets the price of the buy back, one may feel there is some 
unfair dealing when the franchisee has some outstanding 
debts. It is believed that the franchisor sets the buy back 
price so that after deducting the franchisee's outstanding 
debts, there is a very small dollar amount paid for the 
equipment and supplies in the buy back. It should be under­
stood that the franchisor does not have to buy back any 
item.
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APPENDIX II
LETTER OF SOLICITATION
Dear (Company),
Seventeen years ago the Small Business Administration (SEA) sponsored a study of Franchising. A spin-off of that 
effort was an analysis of the contractual elements of fran­chising. Since then franchising has changed considerably.
We are currently engaged in an effort to find out how these changes have affected the franchise agreement. We 
intend to compare the agreements of the late 1960s to those currently in use.
In order to do this we need your cooperation in the 
form of one of your present agreements that would be issued to a prospective franchisee- This information will be kept confidential and no franchisor will be identified with specific provisions reported in our final report. The 
methodology will be similar to that used in the Franchise Agreement Handbook published by Purdue Univ. in 1971.
I am a Captain in the United States Air Force assigned 
to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. In addition to my duties as a Command Post Controller, I am currently working on a 
Master of Business Administration. This study is part of the final requirement for my graduation.
This study is being supervised by Dr. Gerald G. Udell, who was part of the study team for the original SBA spon­
sored study at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.Dr. Udell also authored the Franchise Agreement Handbook.
This study is endorsed by the International Franchise 
Association and your cooperation would be greatly 
appreciated.
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APPENDIX III
FREQUENCY OF PROVISIONS' OCCURRENCE (Based upon contracts of 26 franchisor organization)
PAYMENTS TO THE FRANCHISOR PROVISIONS
Number of Contracts Percent
1 . FRANCHISE FEE 26 1 0 0
2 . NON-REFUNDABLE FEES 14 54
3. ROYALTY 23 8 8
4. NATIONAL ADVERTISING 23 88
5. LOCAL ADVERTISING 16 62
6 . RENEWAL FEE 1 0 30
7. SERVICE FEE 7 27
8 . RENTAL/LEASE PAYMENTS 8 31
9. RENT ADJUSTMENT 1 4
1 0 . PURCHASE PAYMENTS 2 8
1 1 . INDIRECT PAYMENTS 0 0
1 2 . SPECIAL PAYMENTS 15 58
13. PENALTIES 17 65
14. SECURITY DEPOSITS 0 0
15. TERMINATION PENALTIES 1 4
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GENERAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
16. LENGTH OF CONTRACT TERMS
17. OPTION TO RENEW
18. EXCLUSIVE TERRITORY
19. START UP DATE
20. FRANCHISOR CONFIDENTIAL 
DISCLOSURE
21. FRANCHISEE CONFIDENTIAL 
DISCLOSURE
22. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
23. HOLD HARMLESS
24. ACT OF GOD
25. NO WAIVER OF DEFAULT
26. ILLEGAL COVENANT
27. LEGAL BUSINESS
28. FRANCHISEE ASSOCIATION 
FORBIDDEN
29. RIGHT TO FUTURE REVISION
30. OPERATING MANUAL
31. GOODWILL PAYMENTS
32. CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCY
33. COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL LAWS
34. FRANCHISE DISABILITY
35. ARBITRATION
36. SITE SELECTION
Number ofContracts
23
18
17
12
2
15
21
18
4
19 
18
2
0
20
21
1
15
15 
13 
12
16
Percent
88
69
63
46
8
58
81
69
15
73
69
8
0
77
81
4
58
58
50
46
62
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVTATONR
Number ofContracts Percent
37. INCORPORATION PERMITTED 23 8 8
38. TRADEMARK RESTRICTION 25 96
39. DISTINCTIVE ARCHITECTURE 16 62
40. GOOD ETHICS 1 2 46
41. S^TATE OF INTERPRETATION 19 73
42. VENUE CLAUSE 4 15
43. SUB-FRANCHISING 1 4
44. CIVIL RIGHTS 0 0
45. FULL TIME 9 35
46 r 'COMPETITIVE BUSINESS 2 1 81
47. RESTRICTION ON SALE OF GOODS
0 0
48. PRODUCT SERVICE 1 4
49. SALES QUOTA 0 0
50. GUARANTEED SALES 0 0
UNIFORMITY PROVISION
Number of 
Contracts Percent
51. PHYSICAL LAYOUT APPROVAL 18 69
52. LOCAL VARIATIONS PERMITTED 3 1 2
53. DAYS OPEN 13 50
54. HOURS OPEN 14 54
55. PRODUCT LINE 2 0 77
56. PRICE CONTROL 2 8
57. ALTERNATION APPROVAL 16 62
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OCCUPANCY PROVISTONR
Number ofContracts E^ment
58. FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP 3 1 2
59. FRANCHISOR OWNERSHIP 5 19
60. FRANCHISEE LEASES 21 81
61. FRANCHISOR LEASES 5 19
62. LEASE APPROVAL 6 23
63. NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE 8 31
64. LEASE BACK 7 27
65. LEASE LOSS 11 42
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FRANCHISOR PROVISIONS
Number of Contracts Percent
6 6 . ANALYZE REPORTS 8 31
67. ADVERTISING 18 69
6 8 . ACCOUNT FOR ADVERTISING FUNDS
8 31
69. ADVISE AND CONSULT 15 58
.70-.. TNSPEGT - —  - 24 92
71. ADVISE FRANCHISEE OF CHANGES
17 65
72. GRAND OPENING ASSISTANCE 17 65
BOOKKEEPING PROVISIONS
Number of Contracts Percent
73. BANK APPROVAL 1 4
74. BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM APPROVAL
7 27
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Number of Contracts Percent
75. BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM REQUIRED 16 62
76. ANNUAL CERTIFIED AUDIT 1 2 46
77. RIGHT TO AUDIT BOOKS 24 92
78. MARGIN OF ERROR 18 69
79. INCOME TAX COPY 8 31
80. PERIODIC REPORTS 23 8 8
81. CASH WITHDRAWAL 0 0
82. PROFIT WITHDRAWAL 0 0
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND TRAINING PROVISIONS
Number of Contracts Percent
83 . EMPLOYEE UNIFORMS 1 1 42
84. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT 7 27
85. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 1 4
8 6 . RIGHT TO HIRE AND FIRE 1 4
87. FRANCHISEE FORMAL TRAINING
22 85
8 8 . FRANCHISEE REFRESHER COURSE
11 42
89. SUBSEQUENT MANAGER TRAINING
18 69
90. KEY EMPLOYEE TRAINING 10 39
91. ALL EMPLOYEE TRAINING 2 8
92. OJT AND ASSISTANCE 7 27
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INSURANCE PROVTRTnwg
Number of 
Contracts
93. FRANCHISOR ADMINISTRATION 7
94. FRANCHISOR CO-INSURED 22
95. CANCELLATION NOTICE 19
96. APPROVAL OF COMPANY 12
97. PROOF OF INSURANCE 23
98. BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 5
99. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 18
100. PERSONAL 12
101. EMPLOYER LIABILITY 21
102. PROPERTY LIABILITY 24
103. PRODUCT LIABILITY 21
Percent
27
85
73
46
88
19
69
46
81
92
81
PURCHASING PROVISIONS
104. PAPER GOODS-MAY BUY
105. PAPER GOODS-MUST BUY
106. PAPER GOODS-VENDOR 
APPROVAL
107. PAPER GOODS-STANDARDS
108. OPERATING SUPPLIES - 
MAY BUY
109. OPERATING SUPPLIES - 
MUST BUY
110. OPERATING SUPPLIES - 
VENDOR APPROVAL
Number of 
Contracts
10
21
3
10
Percent
19
0
39
81
12
23
39
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111. OPERATING SUPPLIES - 
STANDARDS
112. EQUIPMENT-MAY BUY
113. EQUIPMENT-MUST BUY
114. EQUIPMENT-STANDARDS
115. SIGNS-MAY/MUST BUY
116. SIGNS-VENDOR APPROVAL
117. SIGNS-STANDARDS
118. PRICE RESTRICTIONS
119. FRANCHISOR-VENDOR REBATE
120^""VENDING APPROVAL
Number ofContracts
18
7
2
17
3
6
17
0
3
12
Percent
69
27
8
65
12
23
65
0
12
46
ADVERTISING PROVISIONS
121. FRANCHISOR/FRANCHISEE 
: : ■ ADVERTISING
122. RIGHT TO ENTER AND DESTROY
123. SIGNS REQUIRED
124. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL
125. ADVERTISING COMMITTEE
Number of Contracts
10
13
17
16
10
Percent
39
50
65
62
39
SALE OR TRANSFER PROVISIONS
126. FRANCHISOR RIGHT OF FIRST APPROVAL
127. FRANCHISEE RIGHT OF 
FIRST APPROVAL
Number of 
Contracts
22
Percent
85
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128. RIGHT OF INHERITANCE
129. LIMITED RIGHT OF 
INHERITANCE
130. NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE
131. FRANCHISOR APPROVAL OF SALE
132. NO FOR-SALE ADVERTISING
133. BINDING UPON SUCCESSORS
134. STOCK TRANSFER APPROVAL
135. NO GOODWILL PAYMENTS
Number ofContracts
13
8
0
20
1
13 
20
14
Percent
50
31
0
77
4
50
77
54
TERMINATION PROVISIONS
136. FAILURE TO PAY
137. FRANCHISEE EARLY 
TERMINATION
138. FRANCHISOR EARLY TERMINATION
139. TERMINATION FOR 
ANY VIOLATION
140. TERMINATION FOR VIOLATION/STANDARDS
141. TERMINATION FOR BANKRUPTCY
142. TERMINATION FOR 
TRAINING FAILURE
143. IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION
144. GRACE PERIOD
Number of Contracts
20
9
3 
9
19
22
4
7
1
Percent
77
35
12
35
73
85
15
27
4
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145. 10-DAY
146. 30-DAY
Number ofContracts
10
15
Percent
39
58
FRANCHISEE OBLIGATION AFTER TERMINATION PROVISIONS
147. COVENANT NOT TO 
COMPETE-YEARS
148. COVENANT NOT TO 
COMPETE-MILES
149. COVENANT NOT TO HIRE
150. COVENANT NOT TO USE SYSTEM
151. COVENANT TO CEASE 
OPERATIONS
152. COVENANT TO CHANGE BUILDING
153. COVENANT TO REMOVE 
SIGNS
154. COST OF ENFORCEMENT
aAT.E AFTER TERMINATION PROVISIONS
Number of 
Contracts
19
18
12
24
15
17
13
155. EQUIPMENT
156. SIGNS
157. TRADEMARK SUPPLIES
158. REGULAR SUPPLIES
Number of Contracts
12
12
12
12
Percent
73
69
15
46
92
58
65
50
Percent
46
46
46
46
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FOOTNOTES
^Henry S . Commager, Documents of American History (New York; Appleton-Century-Croft, 1962), p.5.
^R.M. Rosenberg and M. Bedell, Profits from Franchising (New York; McGraw-Hill Inc., 1969), p.9.
^Robert M. Goldenson, ed., "The Franchise Guide", Princeton: Resource Publications. INC.. 1969, p.116 FF.
'Udell, 11-15, see Turabian, 9.137, p.161.
®U.S. Congress, "Senate Subcommittee on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Select Committee on Small 
Business, 95th Congress", 2nd Sess., 1970, pp. 49-50.
®Ibid.
’Udell, 4-8.
“Ibid.
’Ibid.
^""Ibid.
^^Ibid.
James A. Murphy, "Franchising: New Problems With an
Old Concept", Bulletin of Business Research. Ohio State 
University. Vol XIVI, No. 6 . June 1971, p.1.
13Udell, 69-70
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